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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional theory, particularly its discussion of 
originalism, is bedeviled by five persistent controversies: (1) 
what to do when historical evidence is difficult to assess and 
does not readily resolve particular controversies; (2) how to 
define judicial activism and decide how much of it is proper; 
(3) how to deal with vagueness and borderline cases; (4) how 
to understand the relationship of judicial and executive 
review of the constitutionality of legislation; and (5) how to 
reconcile interpretive theory with possibly-erroneous 
precedent.  This article contends that all of these problems 
can be solved, or at least framed in a way that makes a 
solution possible, if we understand the relationship of 
knowledge to the Constitution. 
Originalism and non-originalism are ontological 
positions, differing on what the Constitution is: whether the 
Constitution is something that changes or grows over time, 
and if so, how.  But ontology is not epistemology.  The 
temporal extent of the Constitution—the ontological entity—
is one issue; the extent of our knowledge of the Constitution—
the epistemic phenomenon—is another.  A third independent 
issue is the distribution of officials’ obligations to obtain 
knowledge of the Constitution in order to enforce it.  A 
Constitution might be (a) unchanging, and yet (b) not fully 
known, and (c) not fully enforced always and everywhere by 
all officials.  Change, knowledge, and enforcement are thus 
independent constitutional phenomena. 
The epistemic/ontological distinction is captured well by 
the well-worn joke about a drunk looking for his keys under a 
lamppost.  A police officer sees him and asks him if he lost his 
keys there.  “No,” the drunk replies, “I lost them down the 
street.  But the light is much better here.”  The originalist in 
this metaphor is the one who insists that the Constitution 
was “dropped”—that is, had its meaning fixed—down the 
street, mainly in 1787 (with some other important bits 
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dropped in 1791 and 1868 or so).  The indeterminacy objection 
to originalism made by Professor David Strauss and others1
The indeterminacy argument for originalism, however, 
fails for the same reason. Justice Antonin Scalia and others
 
is, then, the complaint that the Constitution simply couldn’t 
have been dropped there, because the light is so poor.  
Contrary to that objection, the Constitution’s requirements 
cannot always be assessed where the light is best. 
2
Because of the divide between epistemic and ontological 
constitutional controversy, there is much more to 
constitutional theory than the rejection or acceptance of 
particular forms of originalism.  In addition to having a 
theory about the Constitution itself, and how it should be 
interpreted, we need principles for (a) assessing when we 
have knowledge about the Constitution, (b) deciding what to 
do when, as often happens, we don’t know what the 
Constitution requires, and (c) deciding who has an obligation 
to pursue knowledge of the Constitution. 
 
have insisted that originalism is the only way to obtain 
sufficient certainty about constitutional requirements.  From 
the perspective of the living constitutionalist who thinks 
there is good reason to think that the Constitution’s 
requirements change over time, albeit in a way that we may 
not be able to discern perfectly, Justice Scalia might be 
compared to a second keys-dropping drunk, this one dropping 
his keys in good light, but on a moving walkway leading to 
the dark.  The second drunk’s looking in the same place and 
the first drunk’s looking in a different one, both merely on the 
basis of better light, confuse ontology and epistemology in 
exactly the same way.  The possible epistemic advantages of a 
fixed Constitution no more guarantee its identity with the 
actual Constitution than do the possible epistemic advantages 
of a changing, up-to-date one. 
I propose three knowledge-related principles, all of which 
can be used by either originalists or non-originalists.  While I 
take them from modern epistemologists—those professionally 
devoted to better understanding concepts like knowledge—
the justification of these principles as constraints on judges or 
other officials would ultimately be based on the meaning and 
 
 1. See infra notes 17–25 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
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relationship of “judicial power,” “legislative power,” and 
“executive power” in the Constitution.3
First, assertions about the Constitution require 
knowledge.  He who asserts must prove; “the Constitution 
requires X, but for all I know, it doesn’t” is not a sensible 
thing for a court, or anyone, to say. 
  Here are the 
principles: 
Second, knowledge about the Constitution requires more 
evidence if the stakes are higher.  The weightier an occasion 
we deem judicial review to be, the more certainty courts need 
for it. 
Third, evidence relevant to the Constitution’s 
requirements should not be ignored by those in a position to 
speak authoritatively about those requirements.  A potential 
speaker has the duty to acquire evidence before speaking; 
only if unable to acquire enough evidence should the potential 
speaker remain silent.  The duty not to speak without 
sufficient evidence is thus matched by a potential speaker’s 
duty to acquire evidence.  However, not all officials are 
always and everywhere in a position to speak authoritatively 
about the Constitution. 
How do these principles resolve our five controversies? 
Controversy (1), involving what to do when evidence is 
unavailable, and which is deployed in indeterminacy 
objections to originalism, can be resolved by distinguishing 
issues of constitutional ontology—what the Constitution is, 
particularly its temporal extent and location—from issues of 
constitutional epistemology—what counts as sufficient 
confidence of the Constitution for various purposes, governed 
by the three principles above.  Because originalism can be 
paired with independent principles of restraint, there is no 
need to adjust our assessment of what the Constitution’s 
nature is simply out of a desire for it to be knowable.  Like 
the drunk’s keys, the Constitution may lie where light is not 
perfect. 
Controversy (2), defining judicial activism, can be 
resolved by applying our three principles.  Improper judicial 
activism is the breach of either the first principle by making 
declarations about the law despite judicial ignorance of key 
considerations, the breach of the second principle by using too 
 
 3. I canvass the historical evidence from each state in a work in progress. 
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low a standard for knowledge given the stakes, or the breach 
of the third principle by speaking to constitutional issues 
without proper authority.  Improper judicial passivity is the 
breach of the third principle either by suppressing evidence 
relevant to constitutional requirements or by improperly 
abdicating the responsibility to speak, or the breach of the 
second principle by using too high a standard for knowledge, 
given the stakes. 
Controversy (3), vagueness, can be resolved if we adopt 
an epistemic view of vagueness, which many philosophers do.  
Fuzzy boundaries to constitutional categories, on this view, 
are simply places where it is not perfectly clear how far a 
constitutional requirement goes, and should be treated like 
any other issues where we lack perfect clarity about what the 
Constitution requires.  If vagueness-as-ignorance 
philosophers are right, then, we should refuse to make 
assertions about the Constitution unless we are far enough 
away from the borderline, given the stakes, to have 
knowledge.  Further, many philosophers who resist epistemic 
views of vagueness characterize vagueness as the lack of 
clarity.  If judicial review requires clear and convincing 
evidence of unconstitutionality, then the lack of clarity in 
borderline cases would require deference to elected branches 
instead of the exercise of judicial power, even if vagueness is 
not merely an epistemic phenomenon. 
Controversy (4), the relationship of executive and judicial 
review of legislation, can be made clearer if we consider the 
possibility that the stakes in executive review might be 
higher than the stakes in judicial review, and thus more 
evidence required for the executive branch than for the 
judicial branch to invalidate a statute in the name of the 
Constitution.  An enforce-but-don’t-defend (EBDD) posture, 
as in the Obama Administration’s approach to DOMA 
litigation, would be sensible in such cases. 
Controversy (5), precedent, can be seen as an 
intertemporal application of principle three.  Not all officials 
dealing with the Constitution are necessarily in a position to 
speak afresh to constitutional requirements.  Those in 
temporal or hierarchical subordination to other interpreters—
such as the executive obeying legislative commands, lower-
level executives obeying higher-level executives, or later 
courts following earlier interpreters when those 
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interpretations have been liquidated or settled by 
prescription—do not always have an obligation, or the power, 
to speak about the Constitution for themselves. 
The following sections tackle the five controversies in 
turn: indeterminacy, activism, vagueness, executive review, 
and precedent. 
I. INDETERMINACY AND ORIGINALISM 
A. Originalism and Non-Originalism as Ontological Claims 
In order to properly consider indeterminacy objections to 
originalism or the living constitution, it is critical to frame 
the dispute between the views properly.  Indeterminacy is 
insufficient evidence, but insufficient evidence of what, 
precisely?  Originalists and non-originalists use different 
criteria to assess claims of constitutionality.  That is, 
originalists and non-originalists use different constitutional 
truthmakers: entities that make claims of the form “X is 
constitutional” or “X is unconstitutional” true.4  Originalists 
of various stripes claim that the truth of constitutional claims 
is ultimately controlled by something that happened at the 
time of the Founding, while living constitutionalists of 
various stripes claim that constitutionality is ultimately 
determined by an event extending across generations or 
occurring today.5
 
 4. For much, much more on the nature of truthmakers, see, e.g., TRUTH 
AND TRUTH-MAKING (E.J. Lowe & A. Rami eds., 2009); TRUTHMAKERS: THE 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd eds., 2005); D.M. 
ARMSTRONG, TRUTH AND TRUTHMAKERS (2004). 
  If we take “unconstitutional” to mean 
 5. To say that constitutionality is ultimately determined by either a 
temporally-confined or intergenerational event is consistent with the relevance 
of other facts and events.  My original-textually-expressed-sense view, for 
instance, assesses constitutionality based on the sense expressed by 
constitutional text at the founding, but also based on the reference-yielding 
facts that are true today, making it a half-dead, half-alive zombie Constitution.  
See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 555 (2006). Living constitutionalists can likewise see the 
original history as relevant, though not ultimately dispositive.  See, e.g., 
Mitchell Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2009) 
(“Originalism is not the view that some feature of the original character of the 
U.S. Constitution—the intent of the framers, the understanding of the ratifiers, 
the text’s original public meaning, or an amalgam of these things—‘matters’ or 
‘is relevant’ to proper constitutional interpretation. So understood, Originalism 
would be a trivial thesis without dissenters.”).  I, then, view non-historical 
considerations as interpretively relevant only because, and to the extent that, 
historical considerations make them relevant.  A non-originalist someone like 
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“inconsistent with ‘the Constitution,’” differences in the 
constitutional truthmaker translate naturally into different 
implicit definitions of “the Constitution.”  The originalist’s 
basic truthmaker—that is, the originalist’s “Constitution”—
will be historically-confined, but the non-originalist’s will not.  
Adding a bit of nuance, we can identify at least six different 
approaches6
(1) the adopters’ original goals and purposes;
 to the questions “what makes constitutional 
claims true?” or “of what does the Constitution consist?”: 
7
(2) the adopters’ original applications;
 
8
(3) the meaning originally expressed by the 




Berman sees historical considerations as relevant, but only because, and to the 
extent that, later considerations do not trump them. 
 
 6. This grid does not use distinctions which some have infused with great 
significance: for instance, the distinction between “original intent” and “original 
understanding,” or the distinction between ratifiers and proposers. To the 
extent that these distinctions are important and produce different criteria for 
assessing constitutionality, they too might be put in terms of differences in 
constitutional ontology. For some deflationary comments on the significance of 
these distinctions, see Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional 
Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1607, 1628–30 (2009). 
 7. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 116 (2005) (extolling “purposes (particularly 
abstractly stated purposes)”); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 288–89 (1964) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that oath requires justices to “effectuate the 
intent and purposes of the Framers”); Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism 
and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 728 (2009) (“The proper 
originalist way to undertake these inquiries would be to look at the ideas of the 
Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution to discern why establishment of 
religion was regarded as a bad thing and what principle condemned it. The 
interpreter would then try to figure out how that principle applied to the case 
being decided.”). 
 8. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 21–22 (2d ed. 1997); 
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 896 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]hese official actions show what it [the Establishment Clause] meant”); Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1857) (“[T]he men who framed 
this declaration were great men—high in literary acquirements, high in their 
sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on 
which they were acting.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875 
(1992) (stating that key is “the text’s original public meaning”); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 
104 YALE L.J. 541, 553 (1994) (suggesting that the key is “the original public 
meaning that the text had to those who had the recognized political authority to 
ratify it into law”); Green, supra note 5, at 560 (“[T]he sense of a constitutional 
expression is fixed at the time of the framing, but the reference is not, because it 
depends on facts about the world, which can change.”); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler 
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(4) the meaning expressed by the constitutional text 
today;10




(6) essentially-contested philosophical concepts 
associated with the constitutional text, elucidated 






Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (“[W]hile the meaning of constitutional 
guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract 
to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within 
the field of their operation. In a changing world it is impossible that it should be 
otherwise. . . . [A] degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to the meaning, but 
to the application of constitutional principles . . . .”). 
 10. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO 
SELF-GOVERNMENT ix–x (1948) (“[The Constitution] derives whatever validity, 
whatever meaning, it has, not from its acceptance by our forefathers one 
hundred and sixty years ago, but from its acceptance by us, now. . . . What do 
We, the People of the United States, mean when we provide for the freedom of 
belief and of the expression of belief?”); id. at 15, quoted in BREYER, supra note 
7, at 25 (“In those words [the Preamble] it is agreed, and with every passing 
moment it is reagreed, that the people of the United States shall be self-
governed.”); Tom W. Bell, The Constitution As If Consent Mattered, 16 CHAP. L. 
REV. 269, 272 (2012) (“A consensualist approach interprets the Constitution’s 
words according to their plain, present, public meaning—the meaning that we, 
the living, faced with claims of federal authority, give to the Constitution’s 
text.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE 
L.J. 1119, 1178 (1995) (“[T]he case-law development of constitutional law is the 
interpretation of the Constitution as written: a process of elaborating 
constitutional principles of application on the basis of paradigm cases; of 
establishing new paradigm cases (although inferior in status to the original 
ones); and of working out the requirements of principled commitments as they 
unfold in practice. In other words, it is a textual process entirely distinct from 
any hypothetical dialogue in which some authoritative figures somewhere else 
are enabled to speak their minds.”); David A. Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1996) (“[W]hen 
people interpret the Constitution, they rely not just on the text but also on the 
elaborate body of law that has developed, mostly through judicial decisions, over 
the years.”); Charles Evan Hughes, Governor of N.Y., Address before the 
Chamber of Commerce (May 3, 1907) (“We are under a Constitution, but the 
Constitution is what the judges say it is. . .”). 
 12. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147 (1977) 
(“The difficult clauses of the Bill of Rights, like the due process and equal 
protection clauses, must be understood as appealing to moral concepts rather 
than laying down particular conceptions . . . .”); id. at 103 (citing W.B. Gallie, 
Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 (1956) 
(discussing Gallie’s concept-conception distinction)); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice 
in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, NW. U. L. 
REV. 410, 417 (1993) (describing “justice-seeking Constitution”). 
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Answers (1) and (2) are non-textualist forms of 
originalism, while (4) to (6) can be seen as non-originalist 
forms of textualism.  Answer (3) aims to be simultaneously 
textualist and originalist.  We can thus arrange the ontologies 












   
Textualist (3) (4), (5), (6) 
 
B. Justice Scalia’s Indeterminacy Arguments For Originalism 
Justice Scalia has argued that non-originalism’s fatal 
flaw is its failure to constrain judges.  He put it this way in 
his Tanner Lecture: “the most glaring defect of Living 
Constitutionalism . . . is that there is no agreement, and no 
chance of agreement, upon what is to be the guiding principle 
of the evolution.  Panta rei [‘everything changes’] is not a 
sufficiently informative principle of constitutional 
interpretation.”13
the question to be decided is not whether the historically 
focused method is a perfect means of restraining 
aristocratic judicial Constitution-writing; but whether it is 
the best means available in an imperfect world.  Or 
indeed, even more narrowly than that: whether it is 
demonstrably much better than what Justice Stevens 
proposes.  I think it beyond all serious dispute that it is 
much less subjective, and intrudes much less upon the 
democratic process.
  Defending a tradition-based approach to 
substantive due process, but setting out principles which 
would apply equally to interpretive method generally, he 





 13. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 44–45 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 14. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3057–58 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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The fundamental coin of the constitutional realm, for 
Scalia, is thus avoidance of “aristocratic judicial Constitution-
writing.”  Whatever best accomplishes that task must, Scalia 
thinks, count as the Constitution.  Scalia’s most recent 
statement of the rationale for originalism, in his book with 
Bryan Garner, is likewise focused on the judicial role: 
Originalism is the only approach to a text that is 
compatible with democracy.  When government-adopted 
texts are given a new meaning, the law is changed; and 
changing written law, like adopting written law in the 
first place, is the function of the first two branches of 
government. . .15
Note especially here the limitation to “written” law, 
which Scalia apparently thinks encompasses executive 
decrees, but not common-law subjects like tort and contract 
law.  A few pages later, Scalia reiterates his argument that 
originalism is uniquely democratic: 
 
[O]nce a nation has decided that democracy, with all its 
warts, is the best system of government, the crucial 
question becomes which theory of textual interpretation is 
compatible with democracy.  Originalism unquestionably 
is.  Nonoriginalism, by contrast, imposes on society 
statutory prescriptions that were never democratically 
adopted.  When applied to the Constitution, 
nonoriginalism limits the democratic process itself, 
prohibiting (through imaginative interpretation of the Bill 
of Rights) acts of self-governance that ‘We the people’ 
never, ever, voted to outlaw.  With nonoriginalism, these 
limitations will be determined, term by term, by Justices 
of the Supreme Court.16
C. Indeterminacy Arguments Against Originalism 
 
Many critics of originalism make exactly the same 
argument as Scalia, only in reverse: they criticize forms of 
originalism for promising certainty about constitutional law 
based on the historical materials, but failing to deliver.  
David Strauss lists three problems with originalism in his 
recent book: indeterminacy of original meaning, 
indeterminacy in translating that meaning to the present 
 
 15. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 82 (2012). 
 16. Id. at 88. 
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day, and the dead-hand moral objection to intergenerational 
assertions of authority.  Here is his explanation of the first 
problem: 
On the most practical level, it is often impossible to 
uncover what the original understandings were: what 
people thought they were doing when they adopted the 
various provisions of the Constitution.  Discovering how 
people in the past thought about their world is the task of 
historians, and there is no reason to think that lawyers 
and judges are going to be good at doing that kind of 
history—especially when they are dealing with 
controversial legal issues that arouse strong sentiments.17
Professor Paul Horwitz makes a similar complaint about 
originalism in a recent blog post: 
 
[O]riginalism, of whatever variety, is an approach to 
constitutional law that actively forces judges into a field in 
which they arguably lack expertise.  It increases rather 
than decreases the epistemological problem. If you were 
looking for a judicial methodology of constitutional 
interpretation that avoided putting judges in a position for 
which they’re ill-suited, presumably you would focus on 
what judges do well and often—crunching doctrine—
rather than on an approach that requires them to do 
history.  Originalists argue that they are required to do 
some form of history because that is what legitimate 
constitutional interpretation requires.  Presumably, then, 
they would argue that whether they can do it well or not, 
it’s what they’re called upon to do just the same . . . .18
In a later short article, Strauss elaborates on the 
indeterminacy of historical materials: 
 
[T]he originalist project [is] a particularly difficult, 
challenging form of intellectual history and one that often 
will, to the honest originalist, turn up the answer “I don’t 
know,” or “there were various ideas and none clearly 
prevailed,” or “they were just confused back then.”  That is 
one difficulty with originalism.  Too often, it will be just 
too hard to figure out the answers to the relevant 
historical questions.19
 
 17. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 18 (2010). 
 
 18. Paul Horwitz, Blackman on “History” and Biochemistry, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(Apr. 17, 2013), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/04/blackman-
on-history-and-biochemistry.html. 
 19. David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 
GREEN FINAL 5/23/2014  12:44 PM 
414 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
In addition to the epistemic difficulties regarding history, 
Strauss adds epistemic difficulties regarding constitutional 
theory: not knowing how, exactly, to translate original history 
to present-day circumstances.  This is the dispute that divides 
textualist from non-textualist forms of originalism, or 
between options (1), (2), and (3) on the constitutional-ontology 
list above.20
Even if we could uncover the original understandings, we 
would be faced with the task of translating those 
understandings so that they address today’s problems.  
The framers or ratifiers of the Constitution had, at best, 
understandings about their world.  How do we apply those 
understandings to our world?
  Strauss thinks that our poor epistemic condition 
with respect to this dispute means that none of these 
originalist options can be right.  He puts it this way in his 
book: 
21
Strauss gives this point a bit more depth in his article: 
 
The second problem, which is even more severe, is what 
you might call the problem of adaptation or translation.  
Suppose we have a very clear idea of what people in an 
earlier generation were thinking when they adopted the 
First, Second, Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendment.  Still, 
their understanding pertained to their world—they were 
adopting the constitutional provision for the world in 
which they lived.  It is fanciful to suppose that Americans 
would have had a clear understanding, in the late 
eighteenth or mid-nineteenth century, about our twenty-
first century world—a world that would have been, to 
them, in every way wildly hypothetical, and in some 
respects literally inconceivable.22
Strauss’s Living Constitution thus aims to make a virtue 
out of what Scalia saw as its major fault.  “Nothing changes” 
is, upon inspection, no more “sufficiently informative [as a] 
principle of constitutional evolution”
 
23
Critics of originalism have further taken overconfidence 
about historical questions as a defining feature of originalism.  
 than is “everything 
changes.” 
 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 140 (2011). 
 20. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 21. STRAUSS, supra note 17, at 18. The third objection, beyond the two 
epistemic objections I quote, is the dead-hand problem.  
 22. Strauss, supra note 19, at 140. 
 23. See Scalia, supra note 13, at 45. 
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Legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin says, for instance, that 
“conservatives . . . have claimed that they can identify the 
original intent of the framers and use their eighteenth-
century wisdom to resolve any modern controversy.”24  
Professor Andrew Koppelman comments: “one of the central 
stated purposes of originalism, and perhaps its chief selling 
point in the popular press, is to produce unique and 
indisputable answers to legal questions in order to eliminate 
the possibility of judicial discretion.”25
D. A Declaration of Epistemic/Onto-Temporal Independence 
  Koppelman thinks, of 
course, that this purpose is unfulfilled. 
All of these criticisms, I claim, are mistaken.  
Originalism is conceptually tied neither to majoritarian 
democracy nor to historical or theoretical overconfidence.  
Majoritarian non-originalism, originalist government by 
judiciary, and suitably humble originalism are all possible. 
Scalia’s conceptual tie between originalism and 
democracy can be unfastened on either end.  Majoritarian 
democracy can be made consistent with non-originalist 
interpretation, and originalism can be implemented in a way 
that allows judges to make virtually unconstrained decisions 
based on their policy preferences. 
The first obvious counterexample to Scalia’s claim that 
“written” law must be adopted and changed only by elected 
legislatures or executive officials is the common law.  
Paradigmatic common-law subjects like torts and contracts 
are, in fact, written, at least today: they are embodied in a 
long line of written opinions.  True, these opinions are not 
legislation, but neither are executive decrees, which Scalia 
has classified as “written.”  If a presidential order 
implementing legislation is deemed to be “written law,” 
simply because it is (a) law and (b) in writing, then judicial 
opinions expounding the common law should count too.  But if 
that is right, then there is nothing inherently improper or 
undemocratic about judges changing “written law.” 
 
 
 24. Jeffrey Toobin, The People’s Choice, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 28, 
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2013/01/28/130128taco_talk 
_toobin. 
 25. Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1919 (2012). 
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Moreover, Scalia’s emphasis on the Article III lifetime 
tenure of federal judges undermines any argument for 
originalist interpretation of state constitutions, many of which 
allow for elected judiciaries.  Should state constitutions with 
elected judiciaries therefore be interpreted by a common-law 
method?26  Further, because Scalia’s argument for originalism 
is confined to proper methods of judicial interpretation, it 
leaves entirely open whether legislative interpretation might 
be properly non-originalist.  Should elected representatives, 
when they interpret the Constitution for themselves, feel 
freer to depart from its historic meaning?  Neither of these 
ideas would appeal, I suspect, to Justice Scalia.  And neither 
of these ideas is plausible if we take the Constitution—as I 
think both the federal Constitution and state constitutions 
present themselves27
Turning to the other side of the coin, Scalia also wrongly 
assumes that originalism “unquestionably” is consistent with 
democracy.  Imagine a constitution, uncontroversially 
understood to have expressed meaning at the time of the 
framing, but which is (a) very murky and difficult to assess, 
—as a collection of expressions obtaining 
their meaning at the time that constitutional provisions are 
adopted.  But whether the Constitution is such a collection is 
a matter of constitutional ontology, not epistemology: where 
we dropped the Constitution, not where the light is most 
favorable for picking it back up.  There is thus no 
conceptually-necessary reason why a constitution that 
changes over time inherently restricts democratic processes. 
 
 26. Justice Scalia considers this objection, to be sure, but his response turns 
on factors that are at best contingently true: “This corrosion of democracy occurs 
even when law-revising judges are elected, as they are in many states.  The five 
or seven or nine members of a state supreme court, lawyers all, can hardly be 
considered a representative assembly.”  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 83. 
Many other elected officials, though, are lawyers, and are certainly not 
demographically representative.  To be a lawyer is hardly to be incapable of 
representing others; indeed, representing others is lawyers’ paradigmatic job.  
Scalia worries that if courts become mini-legislatures, “[t]he selection of 
judges—even appointed judges—thus becomes an eminently political, results-
oriented process.”  Id. at 84.  Maybe so, but that normative question does not 
seem tied either way to the issue of when constitutional meaning is fixed.  A 
parliamentary system could do without judicial review; alternatively, the 
judiciary might be converted into the third house of a tricameral legislature.  
Neither of these changes would necessarily alter a Constitution’s temporal 
ontology. 
 27. See generally Green, supra note 6 (proposing a mode of interpretation 
for Constitutions).  
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and also (b) interpreted and implemented by judges according 
to a strict preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.  It is 
logically consistent with originalism to have an unchanging 
Constitution that explicitly authorized judges to use a very 
low standard of proof regarding very-difficult-to-discern 
constitutional provisions.  Such a Constitution would be 
originalist, but would, as Strauss and others fear,28
Generally speaking—other things being equal and in the 
absence of reason to think otherwise—the sensible 
Framers enacted sensible requirements into the 
Constitution.  I too am generally a sensible person.  I 
think X is a sensible requirement.  In the absence of any 
evidence that X was not enacted into the Constitution, I 
therefore conclude that the preponderance of the evidence 
supports the conclusion that X is (and always was!) a 
constitutional requirement. 
 invite 
judges to see the Constitution as a mirror of their own values.  
Sufficient inscrutability, combined with a sufficiently 
minimal burden of proof, can let judicial policymaking run 
riot. Imagine a judge reasoning this way: 
This is, I think, cogent reasoning from the premises; the-
framers-were-probably-like-me reasoning does supply some 
evidence, though not much.  Originalism only undermines 
judicial activism if, as a contingent matter of fact, we either 
have enough clarity in historical materials to contradict 
judicial preferences, or our constitution sets a standard of 
proof higher than the minimal amount of evidence supplied 
by the-framers-were-probably-like-me reasoning.  The latter 
is, I think, the case under our actual Constitution, but not all 
originalist Constitutions need do so. 
Strauss, Toobin, and Koppelman likewise misconstrue 
the question to which originalism and its denial give rival 
answers.  To be sure, Justice Scalia poses originalism as an 
answer to the question, “How can we resolve constitutional 
 
 28. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 142–43 (“If the original materials are 
routinely murky, the purportedly originalist interpreter will be tempted to read 
his or her own views into them.  This need not be a matter of bad faith.  There is 
a natural tendency for any interpreter to think that the founding generations 
were composed of smart, sensible people, like—well, the interpreter himself.  It 
is very difficult, when the historical materials are unclear, not to see things 
through one’s own eyes.  If judicial restraint means abjuring one’s own views in 
favor of the law, then originalist interpretation is, contrary to its claims, an 
open invitation to be unrestrained.”). 
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controversies with maximal certainty?”  A better question, 
however, is simply “How is the Constitution situated 
temporally?”  That question frames the controversy over 
originalism simply as a dispute over the temporal extent and 
location of truthmakers for constitutional claims, not in terms 
of purported epistemic advantages. 
The dispute between historically-confined and 
temporally-extended views of the Constitution is closely 
analogous to a dispute over the size of an object.  Instead of 
size in space, however, the constitutional dispute concerns 
time: the duration of the constitutional event.  How long does 
the constituting take (or did it take, if it is already complete)?  
Was it short, or long?  The length of an event in time (e.g., 
“Notre Dame home football games last four hours”) is the 
same kind of issue as, say, the height of a building (e.g., “The 
Freedom Tower is 1776 feet high”), or the length of a state 
(e.g., “Mississippi is 291 miles from the Louisiana border to 
the Tennessee border”).  Any of those sizes can exist 
independently of our ability to assess those sizes. 
We should also distinguish the Constitution’s “temporal 
size”—the issue for originalism as I see it—from size in 
“policy space”: how many issues are settled by the 
Constitution itself and how many issues are left for resolution 
by the political branches.  Many of those who call for restraint 
are really calling for small Constitutions in this sense.29
Indeterminacy-based objections to originalism (and, of 
course, much of the determinacy-based originalist 
advertising, like Justice Scalia’s, to which they respond) thus 
confuse the issue properly related to originalism—what the 
Constitution is, and where it is located historically—with the 
epistemic issue of how much access we have to that entity.  
Think again of the drunk and his keys.  We have left critical 
portions of our constitutional truthmakers, the originalist 
says, somewhere in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries—mainly around 1787, 1791, and 1868.  The 
indeterminacy objector complains that looking so far in the 
past for our constitutional requirements is too hard, because 
the light there is very bad; it’s hard to tell exactly what was 
  That 
is not really restraint by judges, but restraint by those 
adopting constitutions in the first place. 
 
 29. See infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
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going on.  The light of 2013 is much better.  But whatever 
epistemic advantages 2013 might have do not supply good 
reason to think that the relevant parts of our actual 
Constitution which render constitutional claims true or false 
are themselves located in 2013. 
Justice Scalia’s answer to the indeterminism challenge to 
originalism is to minimize indeterminacy, not to distinguish 
epistemic from ontological issues.  Essentially, he tells the 
searcher under the lamppost that the light actually is 
tolerably good, or even better, where the keys were dropped: 
better the difficult job of deriving answers from 250 or 150 
years ago, Scalia might say, than the impossible one of 
justifying the proper next chapter in the common-law 
constitution’s chain novel.  This relative epistemic advantage 
of history, however, is at best contingently true, and probably 
frequently false.  Many historical questions are quite obscure, 
and judges who have sufficiently internalized common law 
methods and habits of mind can, at least sometimes, seem to 
have adequate justification for their results. 
Originalists have sometimes advertised their theory as a 
refuge of certainty (or at least relative certainty) from the 
raging seas of the living constitution, and such advertising 
has not disappeared entirely.  Justice Scalia’s argument that 
originalism preserves democracy by restraining judges is 
certainly one such instance.  But such promises of relative 
certainty have no necessary connection to originalism as 
such.  Originalism, to be originalism, need only promise an 
unchanging Constitution, not a perfectly knowable one.  
Likewise, originalists need not disparage the possible 
epistemic virtues of a changing Constitution.  Tort law and 
contract law, for instance, extend temporally across 
generations, but are still knowable.  Common-law 
constitutionalism simply claims that the Constitution is like 
these common-law subjects.  In short, we must distinguish 
positions like originalism from their advertising. 
The epistemologically-rooted principles of judicial 
restraint I will set out below govern what to do precisely 
when sufficient certainty about historical materials is not 
available.  Some originalists are overconfident, to be sure, but 
they are not so simply by definition.  If it is impossible to 
uncover what the original understandings were (with 
sufficient certainty given the interests at stake—of this more 
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below), we are simply ignorant of what the Constitution 
means.  We then need principles for dealing with ignorance, 
to be sure, but modifying our assessment of the temporal 
extent of the Constitution should not, I think, be one of them.  
Constitutional truthmakers do not always lie where the light 
is best. 
The restraint principles I suggest here are independent of 
originalism as such.  Non-originalists could adopt them too, 
by requiring a great level of certainty in judgments about the 
requirements of a common-law constitution before striking 
down statutes.  Originalism is consistent with them, and the 
original meaning of “judicial power” might require them, but 
this is true only as a contingent matter.  On my view of 
constitutional meta-theory, a form of originalism is required 
not because of its contingent relation to judicial restraint,  
but instead because it fits with the constitutional  
self-presentation—“This Constitution”—in Article VI.30   
The no-assertion-without-knowledge, no-knowledge-without-
sufficient-evidence-given-the-stakes, and no-suppression-of-
relevant-evidence principles can, I think, help judges from 
substituting their own values for those of the Constitution, 
but these principles do not just fall out of originalism by 
definition.  Depending on what the history turns up, these 
principles might or might not fit with the meaning expressed 
by “judicial power” at the Founding.  I suspect they do, but 
that depends on the contingent historical investigation.31
 
 30. U.S. CONST. art VI; see Green, supra note 
 
6, at 1628–30. 
 31. Because these restraint principles are consistent with either originalist 
or non-originalist views of the nature of the Constitution, an interpreter might 
also apply them who is unsure about constitutional ontology.  That is, the 
interpreter might be unsure whether to be an originalist or not, and so conduct 
parallel inquiries.  First, given originalism, how good are the grounds for 
thinking the original meaning of the constitutional text requires result X?  
Second, given the living constitution, how good are the grounds for thinking 
that the evolving common-law constitutional principles require result X?  If 
theoretical issues are closer or more difficult than particular disputes, an 
interpreter might have sufficient evidence to assert that the Constitution 
requires X even while lack such evidence regarding the basic nature of the 
Constitution itself.  That would be an instance of “incompletely theorized 
agreement.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. 
L. REV. 1733, 1735–36 (1995). 
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II. THE JUDICIAL ACTIVISMOMETER: ACTIVISM AS THE BREACH 
OF EPISTEMIC PRINCIPLES 
What, then, should courts or others charged with 
applying the Constitution do when the originalist evidence is 
not perfectly clear?  Principles about how to accommodate 
lack of certainty do not follow necessarily from a resolution of 
the temporal location of the Constitution.  I propose three 
principles from modern epistemology to govern when courts 
or executive officials should declare that statutes violate the 
Constitution.  I think that my three principles are true moral 
norms, but that they also fit the meanings of “judicial power,” 
“executive power,” and “legislative power” in the Constitution.  
I thus aim to reconcile, to the extent that I can, the insights of 
modern epistemology—which are themselves really just 
refined common sense—with historical understandings of the 
interpretive powers of the three branches of government.  We 
can define activism (and improper passivity) as the breach of 
these three principles. 
Defining judicial activism and restraint in terms of these 
epistemic offers an appropriately nuanced account of notions 
that puzzle many observers.32  An epistemic approach to 
judicial activism avoids the pitfalls of other definitions.  Some 
define activism simply in terms of the raw frequency with 
which judges hold statutes or executive actions 
unconstitutional.33  That approach confuses the activism issue 
with the issue of whether we have a large Constitution, 
putting many restraints on officials, or a small one, letting 
them do more of what they want.34  Others define activism 
directly in terms of departures from originalism, rendering 
common-law-constitutionalism ipso facto activist.35
 
 32. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in 
Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2002) (“Everyone scorns 
judicial ‘activism,’ that notoriously slippery term.”); Richard A. Posner, The Rise 
and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519, 520 (2012) (“The term 
‘judicial self-restraint’ is a chameleon.”). 
  That 
 33. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, A Hand in the Matter: Has the Rehnquist 
Court pushed its agenda on the rest of the country?, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Mar.–Apr. 
2003), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2003/feature_marapr03 
_sunstein.msp (“I suggest that it is helpful to measure judicial activism in the 
way just mentioned—by seeing how often a court strikes down the actions of 
other parts of government, especially the actions of Congress.”); Easterbrook, 
supra note 32, at 1405 (defining activism as “pro-judge decision making”). 
 34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 35. BERGER, supra note 8, at 21–22 (“[A]ntiactivists (originalists) maintain 
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definition ignores critical differences in the different ways 
which fellow originalists can approach the extent of judicial 
power (distinguishing, say, Lino Graglia from Randy 
Barnett36), as well as rendering unintelligible the differences 
in the degree of restraint characterizing non-originalists 
(distinguishing, say, J. Harvie Wilkinson from Ronald 
Dworkin37).  Still others define activism as substituting 
personal views for the Constitution’s actual requirements.38
Philosophers have spent a great deal of care developing 
their ideas about how language works and how language 
ought to work.  Other things being equal and in the absence 
of reason to think otherwise, we can assume that their ideas 
probably match how constitutional language works and ought 
to work, but historical investigation would be required to nail 
down the point fully.  We can generally rely on philosophers 
to produce distinctions that are coherent, relatively free of 
conceptual confusion, and as clear as they can reasonably be 
made.  Whether those distinctions describe the actual 
Constitution and the methods proper to its enforcement and 
application is, of course, distinct from the philosophical value 
of those distinctions in contemporary epistemology.  A full 
  
But the normative force of the activism charge, on this view, 
goes little further than the simple charge of error: if the 
Constitution is obligatory, after all, departing from it is the 
chief sin, no matter what we use instead.  An epistemic 
approach gives more nuanced advice to judges while 
remaining compatible with a broad range of views about what 
the Constitution is: big or small, originalist or non-originalist. 
 
that judges are not authorized to revise the Constitution and that it is to be 
construed in light of the Founders’ explanations of what they meant to 
accomplish, no more, no less.”) (citation omitted). 
 36.  Compare, e.g., RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004), with Lino A. Graglia, United States v. 
Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719 (1996). 
 37.  Compare, e.g., J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-
GOVERNANCE (Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2012), with DWORKIN, supra note 12. 
 38.  See, e.g., Judicial Activism, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Judicial_activism (“Judicial activism describes judicial rulings suspected of 
being based on personal or political considerations rather than on existing 
law.”) (last visited Mar. 27, 2014); Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 1401 (“Many 
of the papers prepared for this symposium are aware of the problem, denounce 
any definition of ‘activism’ that just equates to ‘wrong decisions, as I see them’—
and then offer a definition of ‘activism’ that equates, once again, to Judges 
Behaving Badly.”). 
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weighing of all of the relevant historical evidence regarding 
the meaning of “judicial power,” “executive power,” and 
“legislative power” to explain when courts or executive 
officials are justified in refusing to enforce legislation is 
beyond the scope of this article.  I do, however, hope to 
present enough selections of the historical evidence to suggest 
that the basic approach of many contemporary philosophers is 
not too jarring a fit with the original understanding of the 
relationship of the three branches in interpreting and 
applying the Constitution. 
This section will first explain the relevant philosophical 
norms and then explain judicial activism in terms of their 
breach, resulting in the “activismometer”: a device for 
measuring activism. 
A. Imports from Philosophy-Land: Williamson, Grice, DeRose, 
Hawthorne, and Stanley 
The two basic ideas that I will take from epistemology 
are neither particularly obscure nor technical, but are rather 
refinements of common sense: we should know whereof we 
speak, and demand more confidence before speaking to 
higher-stakes propositions.  The first idea is that 
that knowledge is the norm of assertion, which has become 
very popular since British philosopher Timothy Williamson’s 
work on the subject in a 1996 paper39 and his 2000 book,40 but 
which were explored in detail by 20th Century 
philosopher Paul Grice and many earlier thinkers.41
 
 39. Timothy Williamson, Knowing and Asserting, 105 PHIL. REV. 489 (1996). 
  The 
second idea is the interest-sensitivity of knowledge, which has 
become increasingly popular since the work of American 
 40. TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS (2000). 
 41. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAYS OF WORDS 27 (1989) (“Logic and 
Conversation” lectures originally given in 1967) (“Under the category of Quality 
falls a supermaxim—‘Try to make your contribution one that is true’—and two 
more specific maxims: 1.  Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say 
that for which you lack adequate evidence.”).  Not all justified true belief is, of 
course, knowledge, see Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 
23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963), but it is plausible that knowledge must be true, 
justified, and believed by the subject.  Williamson’s account would thus entail 
Grice’s 3 Quality maxims, but not vice-versa, given Gettier.  For another 
prominent defense of the knowledge account of assertion, see Keith DeRose, 
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context, 111 PHIL. REV. 167 (2002).  For earlier very 
similar ideas, see the sources cited infra at notes 52 to 53 and accompanying 
text. 
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philosopher Keith DeRose beginning in 199242 and books 
by John Hawthorne in 200443 and Jason Stanley in 2005.44
1. Knowledge and Assertion 
  
The idea behind knowledge as the norm of assertion is 
that we normally should not assert what we don’t know.  We 
should stick to what we know, and, if we are ordinary 
participants in a conversation on the topic, say what we do 
know without deliberately staying unnecessarily ignorant or 
leaving others unnecessarily ignorant.  If someone makes an 
assertion, it is normally proper to ask in response, “How do 
you know that?”  If someone asks me a multiple-choice 
question, and the answers are “Yes,” “No,” and “I don’t know,” 
then usually these answers are both exhaustive of the 
possible replies (as long as a reply is reasonably expected) 
and non-overlapping.  Ordinarily if I say “Yes,” I’m not also 
tempted to say “I don’t know.”  If I don’t know, I shouldn’t 
answer yes.  On the other hand, if I do know, so that “I don’t 
know” isn’t a proper response, then I should be willing to 
assert either “Yes” or “No” in response. 
The twin obligations to restrict assertions to areas in 
which we have knowledge, but also to contribute whatever 
relevant knowledge we do have, are reflected in Paul Grice’s 
conversational maxims of Quality and Quantity.  Grice’s 
three-part Quality requirement (requiring truth, belief, and 
evidence) amounts to a justified-true-belief requirement for 
assertions.45  The twin Quantity rules are to “[m]ake your 
contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange),” but “[d]o not make your 
contribution more informative than is required.”46
 
 42. See Keith DeRose, Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions, 52 PHIL. 
& PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 913 (1992) [hereinafter DeRose, Knowledge 
Attributions]; see also Keith DeRose, Solving the Skeptical Problem, 104 PHIL. 
REV. 1 (1995). 
 
 43. JOHN HAWTHORNE , KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES (2004). 
 44. JASON STANLEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICAL INTERESTS (Peter Ludlow 
& Scott Sturgeon eds., 2005).  Hawthorne and Stanley’s version of interest-
sensitivity turns on the stakes for the one who believes a particular proposition, 
while DeRose’s version turns on the stakes in the context of the use of the term 
“knowledge.”  I agree with Hawthorne and Stanley on this point, but DeRose’s 
bank examples illustrate interest-sensitivity nicely, even if his particular 
contextualist epistemology does not flow from them inevitably.  
 45. See GRICE, supra note 41. 
 46. Id. at 26. 
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These two maxims leave open, of course, exactly how 
much information—i.e., how many knowledgeable 
assertions—are “required” in different conversational 
contexts.  When exactly is it proper to inform a conversation 
partner about something?  Courts frequently hold that it is 
improper to address certain questions about law through 
jurisdiction-limiting doctrines like those concerning political 
questions, standing, and the like.  These doctrines literally 
limit the speaking of the law—juris-diction.  Those lacking 
jurisdiction are not in a position to enforce the Constitution—
to speak the law—in that context.  Courts’ conversational 
context makes certain assertions appropriate and other 
assertions inappropriate. 
These sorts of contextually-imposed limits on when it is 
proper to speak, and to whom, are common features of social 
life.  One version of a duty to speak is embodied in the New 
York Metropolitan Transportation Authority slogan, now 
licensed to the Department of Homeland Security: “If you see 
something, say something.”47
 
 47. “If You See Something, Say Something” Campaign, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/if-you-see-something-say-something-
campaign (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
  Those with knowledge have an 
obligation to speak. Such an obligation to speak is, of course, 
not universal.  Someone who sees evidence of a terrorist plot 
has an obligation to say something to the relevant 
antiterrorist authorities—not, say, to the press, or those who 
might tip off the terror plotters—and has no individual 
obligation to enforce the law and stop the plot individually.  
Social life is filled with other limits—confidences, invasions of 
privacy, and the like—on the obligation or permissibility of 
saying what we know.  My grandfather used to tell his 
children frequently, “Your powers of observation exceed your 
tact.”  Not all truths are always and everywhere to be told by 
everyone.  Further, obtaining information is costly, and there 
are issues about how much investigation can reasonably be 
expected, even from those with authority to speak to an issue.  
Obviously, those who have pertinent information and are 
properly engaged in a conversation on a topic should use the 
information, but the extent of their duty to obtain more 
information will depend on its cost.  Limits on judicial duties 
to speak are similar. 
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The distribution of official duties to speak about the 
Constitution produced by an application of Grice’s Quantity 
maxim in a contextually-sensitive way represents the 
distribution of authority to enforce the Constitution.  Below, I 
will argue that not everyone at all times is required to enforce 
the Constitution according to his best understanding of the 
Constitution’s meaning; sometimes some officials must allow 
others’ actions to stand without presuming to contradict these 
other officials’ authority in the name of the Constitution.  
Immanuel Kant’s 1784 comments in What is Enlightenment?, 
distinguishing between “public” and “private” use of 
individual judgment—approximately the opposite of what 
such terms would ordinarily connote—aptly describe the 
same sort of limits on the free use of one’s reason in fulfilling 
governmental functions: 
[T]he public use of reason must at all times be free, and it 
alone can bring about enlightenment among men; the 
private use of reason, however, may be very narrowly 
restricted without the progress of enlightenment being 
particularly hindered.  I understand, however, under the 
public use of his own reason, that use which anyone 
makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the 
reading world.  The private use I designate as that use 
which one makes of his reason in a certain civil post or 
office which is entrusted to him.  Now a certain 
mechanism is necessary in many affairs which are run in 
the interest of the commonwealth by means of which some 
members of the commonwealth must conduct themselves 
passively in order that the government may direct them, 
through an artificial unanimity, to public ends, or at least 
restrain them from the destruction of these ends.  Here 
one is certainly not allowed to argue; rather, one must 
obey. . . .  [I]t would be very destructive, if an officer on 
duty should argue aloud about the suitability or the utility 
of a command given to him by his superior; he must 
obey.48
The “use which one makes of his reason in a certain civil 
post or office which is entrusted to him” is, of course, the sort 
of knowledge of the Constitution that is at stake in judicial or 
executive review.  Kant properly notes that complete freedom 
 
 
 48. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in 
WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ANSWERS AND TWENTIETH-
CENTURY QUESTIONS 59–60 (James Schmidt ed. & trans., 1996). 
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of individual judgment for those occupying official positions is 
generally not practicable.  “Artificial unanimity”—that is, the 
distribution of authority among particular officials with 
responsibility to speak about the Constitution on behalf of the 
whole government—must sometimes be imposed.  The 
application of this point to issues like executive review and 
precedent will be explored below. 
Is knowledge as the norm of assertion a limit on the 
proper scope of “judicial power” under the Constitution?  
There is some reason to think that it is.49  Marbury v. 
Madison, of course, justifies judicial review as an application 
of the judicial duty to declare the law: “It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the 
law is.”50  Absent special reason to think that judicial 
assertions about the law are a radically different sort of 
assertion than the sort of assertions governed by 
philosophical norms, we would expect them to require 
knowledge.51  If knowledge requires some degree of proof, the 
knowledge-as-norm-of-assertion principle entails the familiar 
idea that “he who asserts must prove.”52
 
 49. In works in progress, I canvass the historical support more thoroughly.  
  Many early cases 
 50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis 
added). 
 51. Knowledge as the norm of assertion can thus supply a philosophical 
basis—though a historical basis would be critical to originalists—for the sort of 
rule that Michael Paulsen, Robert Bork, and Lino Graglia have advocated.  See, 
e.g.,  ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 166 (1990) (“The judge who 
cannot make out the meaning of a provision is in exactly the same circumstance 
as a judge who has no Constitution to work with.  There being nothing to work 
with, the judge should refrain from working.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 
217, 333 (1994) (“An individual (or branch) should have an especially high 
degree of certainty in the correctness of his (its) conclusions before upsetting the 
cooperative project by advancing a view at odds with that of a co-equal 
interpreter.”); Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1044 (1992) (“[judicial review appropriate] only when (as 
would very rarely be the case) the choice is clearly disallowed by the 
Constitution.”) (citation omitted).  Lynn Baker has complained that the Bork-
Graglia-Paulsen view lacks foundations. See Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional 
Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons From the Spending Power, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 495, 501 (2009) (“[N]owhere does the Constitution state that uncertainties 
in constitutional meaning should be resolved by the courts in favor of sustaining 
the challenged legislation.”).  However, the knowledge-as-norm-of-assertion 
rule, if historically substantiated, could supply one. 
 52. “The proposition that he who asserts must prove is a basic principle of 
rational thinking, not a normative theory of governance.”  Gary Lawson, Dead 
Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1235 (2012); see also Lawson, supra 
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quote the maxim Justinian’s Digest attributes to second- and 
third-century jurist Paul: Ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non 
qui negat—he who asserts, not who denies, must prove.53
Unquestionably, it is our duty to presume that the 
legislature, in the enactment of any given statute, has not 
transcended its powers.  This presumption is but the 
result of two maxims of the law, namely, omnia 
presumuntur rite esse acta [all things are to be presumed 
done in due form], and ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit.  In 
all cases, then, where the constitutionality of a statute is 
brought in question, the burden of proof is on him who 
asserts the unconstitutionality.
  
Sadler v. Langham, from the Alabama Supreme Court in 
1859, explicitly ties the presumption of constitutionality to 
the ei incumbit probatio maxim: 
54
It is possible, however, to construe judicial review as 
something other than an affirmative assertion that a statute 
is unconstitutional.  Professor Gary Lawson, for instance, has 
contended that those who seek to enforce federal statutes 





  “Judicial 
review” would thus, on Lawson’s view, encompass failures of 
proof as well as affirmative assertions that statutes are in 
9, at 871 (“Whenever the fact finder is not satisfied that the available 
evidence meets the threshold for either truth or falsity with respect to a 
relevant proposition, leaving ‘I don’t know’ as the epistemologically appropriate 
answer, the law imposes the burden of that uncertainty upon someone, enabling 
the fact finder to render a decision in the case without necessarily fixing the 
legal truth value of the claim.”). 
 53. DIG. 22.3.2 (Julius Paulus Prudentissimus).  For early citations of the 
rule, see, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *366;  Dufour v. 
Camfrancq, 8 Mart. (o.s.) 235, 269 (La. 1820); Clark v. Dodge Healy, 5 F. Cas. 
949, 951 (E.D. Pa. 1827); Bentley v. Bentley, 7 Cow. 701, 704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1827); Ross v. Gould, 5 Me. 204, 209 (1828); Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. (6 
How.) 550, 597 (1848); Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324, 335 (1849); SAMUEL MARCH 
PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 150 (2d ed. 1815); SIMON 
GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 74, at 85 (1842); W.M. 
BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE § 254, at 191 (1849). 
 54. Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 320–21 (1859).  
 55. Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 411, 426 (1996) (“[T]he first allocation of the burden of proof 
always will be on the federal government to prove that it is not acting ultra 
vires.  If there is indeterminacy, and one cannot establish (given the 
appropriate standard of proof) the meaning of one of the provisions granting 
powers to the federal government, the federal government loses in any case in 
which it must rely on that provision.  To uphold an action of the federal 
government, one must be able to say affirmatively that the government has the 
power to act.”). 
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fact unconstitutional.  A key issue is whether enforcing a 
statute in court counts as an implicit assertion that the 
statute is constitutional.  Lawson thinks that it is,56 but 
without offering significant historical support.57  In work in 
progress, I will canvass the historical data to test his views.  
A second possible alternative formulation might be the 
assertion that the legislature has breached its own duty not 
to pass unconstitutional laws.58  The legislature’s own failure 
to consider constitutional questions sufficiently carefully does 
not, of course, mean that the statute actually conflicts with 
the Constitution.  Lynn Baker offers a third possible way for 
judges to respond to indeterminacy: by adopting 
constitutional rules that will be the most likely to be 
overturned through the Article V process.59
 
 56. Id. at 425–26 (“[T]here is always at least an implicit assertion in any 
exercise of federal power that there is something in the Constitution that 
affirmatively authorizes the federal government to act.”). 
  Judicial review 
would under Baker’s theory merely assert that a rule is 
consistent with what is known about the actual Constitution, 
as well as maximize the potential for Article V correction.  
 57. Indeed, Lawson says that “virtually everybody in the founding era who 
had anything at all interesting to say about judicial review” took the view that 
“if the meaning of the relevant constitutional provision is indeterminate, the 
challenged law stands.”  Id. at 424 (citing SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990)). 
 58. Modern strict scrutiny doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause and 
the First Amendment seems to use such an approach when it strikes down 
statutes because the government has failed to show that it was actually 
motivated by interests known to be sufficiently important when it passed 
legislation.  See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 n.7 (1976) (suggesting 
that only “the true purpose,” not a “post hoc rationalization,” is relevant in 
applying intermediate scrutiny); Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 
2739 n.8 (2011) (stating that insufficient “degree of certitude,” and agnosticism 
on effects of violent video games, means statute fails strict scrutiny); id. at 2740 
(stating that strict scrutiny only satisfied if “the government is in fact pursuing 
the interest it invokes”).  Other interpretations of the doctrine are possible, 
however.  We might instead interpret later courts as inferring the lack of a 
proper justification from the failure of the legislature to justify it at the time it 
acted.  See infra notes 94–99 and accompanying text. 
 59. Baker, supra note 51, at 496 (“[W]henever possible, the Supreme Court 
should interpret any ambiguities in the text of the Constitution such that the 
party disadvantaged by the interpretation is the party more likely, as matter of 
logical possibility, to be able to obtain a constitutional amendment to ‘correct’ 
the Court’s interpretation.  Put differently, when choosing among plausible 
interpretations of an ambiguous constitutional provision, the Court should 
choose the interpretation favored by (or most likely to benefit) the party that is 
less likely, as a matter of logical possibility, to be able to obtain a constitutional 
amendment to ‘correct’ the Court’s interpretation.”) (citations omitted). 
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Whether judicial review should be understood in one of these 
more limited ways—or to put it the other way around, 
whether these more limited circumstances would justify 
judicial review—is another question I leave open pending a 
full historical investigation. 
2. Knowledge and Interests 
The second basic idea that I import from current 
epistemology to the law is the interest-sensitivity of 
knowledge.  How much we have riding on a proposition will 
help determine whether we know it.  More at stake means 
that the “knowledge” honorific requires more evidence (and, if 
we accept knowledge as the norm of assertion, so does 
assertion).  The standard example60 is varying levels of 
evidence required in order to know a proposition like “the 
bank is open on Saturday.”  It’s Friday and I’m thinking of 
going to the bank, but I’ve got other things to do, so if I know 
it’ll be open tomorrow morning, I’ll wait until then.  Now, if I 
need to go to the bank to get cash for a poker game on 
Saturday, that’s a low-stakes context.  A vague recollection of 
seeing cars at the bank on a Saturday last month would 
count.  But if I need to deposit a paycheck to avoid eviction or 
a mortgage default on Monday, that’s a high-stakes context: if 
I only have a vague recollection, I’d say, “Well, I don’t know 
it’s open tomorrow.” Knowledge requires more evidence in 
that context.61
A great many early explanations of judicial deference to 
the legislature argue in very similar terms.  The 1787 
correspondence between James Iredell and Richard Dobbs 
Spaight, while Spaight was attending the Philadelphia 
Convention only a month before the Convention submitted 
the Constitution for signing and ratification, is instructive.  
Iredell, who had held several judicial positions in North 





 60. See DeRose, Knowledge Attributions, supra note 
 and the North Carolina Supreme Court had 
42, at 913. 
 61. Gary Lawson made a similar point earlier (1992) than most of the 
philosophers considered here. See Lawson, supra note 9, at 879 (“The degree of 
certainty, and hence the standard of proof, that people require before accepting 
propositions as true for particular purposes varies with the consequences of that 
acceptance.”). 
 62. JAMES IREDELL, TO THE PUBLIC (Aug. 17, 1786), reprinted in in 2 
GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 145–49 
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embraced the idea in Bayard v. Singleton in 1787.63  Spaight 
was alarmed, because he thought that judicial review of the 
legislature’s assessments of constitutionality would lack any 
further review by others.  Put another way, he thought that 
type-II errors of commission64
If they possessed the power, what check or control would 
there be to their proceedings? or who is there to take the 
same liberty with them, that they have taken with the 
Legislature, and declare their opinions to be 
erroneous? . . .  [W]henever the judges should become 
corrupt, they might at pleasure set aside every law, 
however just or consistent with the Constitution, to 
answer their designs; and the persons and property of 
every individual would be completely at their disposal.
 (that is, cases where courts act 
but should have remained passive) were more serious than 
type-I errors of omission (that is, cases where courts 
remained passive but should have acted) because such errors 
were less likely to be remedied.  Spaight argued, 
65
Iredell replied that this fear of judicial self-
aggrandizement would apply equally to many uncontroversial 
cases of judicial power, and so were not a good argument 
against judicial review as such.  However, the worry about 
irreversibility would nonetheless support caution in “a 
doubtful matter:”  “[W]hen once you establish the necessary 
existence of any power, the argument as to abuse ceases to 
destroy its validity, though in a doubtful matter it may be of 
great weight.”
 
66  Iredell then qualified his support of judicial 
review with a rule of deference: “In all doubtful cases, to be 
sure, the Act ought to be supported: it should be 




  Later judicial statements of deference refer 
repeatedly to the “delicacy,” “magnitude,” “gravity,” and 
“importance” of the occasion of judicial review as 
justifications for a measure of deference to legislative 
 63. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (1787). 
 64. On the distinction between type-I and type-II errors, see, e.g., DAVID J. 
SHESKIN, HANDBOOK OF PARAMETRIC AND NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICAL 
PROCEDURES 59 (3d ed. 2004). 
 65. IREDELL, supra note 62, at 169. 
 66. Id. at 173–74. 
 67. Id. at 175. 
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judgments regarding the Constitution.68
 
 68. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (“The 
question, whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the constitution, is, at all 
times, a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in 
the affirmative, in a doubtful case.”) (emphasis added); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 
12 Ky. 90, 94 (1822) (“Whether or not an act of the legislature conflicts with the 
constitution, is, at all times, a question of great delicacy, and deserves the most 
mature and deliberate consideration of the court.”); Runnels v. State, 1 Miss. 
146, 146–47 (1823) (“In the opinion, which will be expressed on this momentous 
question, I cannot feel insensible either as it regards the ‘magnitude of the case,’ 
or the delicacy of our situation.  The constitutionality of a legislative act, forms 
the subject of our enquiries, and on more occasions than one, I have expressed 
the diffidence and reluctance, and consequently ‘the caution and 
circumspection,’ with which I approach such investigations.”) (emphasis added); 
Dyer v. Tuskaloosa Bridge Co., 2 Port. 296, 303 (Ala. 1835) (“An investigation 
into the constitutionality of an act of a co-ordinate department of the 
government, is always a delicate, if not a painful duty.”) (emphasis added); Trs. 
of Caledonia Cnty. Grammar Sch. v. Burt, 11 Vt. 632, 637 (1839) (“The most 
delicate and most important duty ever to be discharged by the judiciary, is to 
pronounce upon the validity of an act of the legislature”) (emphasis added); 
State v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 12 G. & J. 399, 400 (Md. 1842) (“To declare 
an act of a co-ordinate department of the government an unwarrantable 
assumption or usurpation of power, because it is a violation of a constitutional 
prohibition, is an exercise of the judicial office, of a grave and delicate nature, 
which never can be warranted but in a clear case.”); Flint River Steamboat Co. 
v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 209 (1848) (“It must be a very clear and palpable case, 
which would warrant the Judiciary to exercise this delicate duty of declaring a 
law unconstitutional . . . .”) (emphasis added); Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 165, 208 
(1855) (“[A]lthough the power is universally admitted, its exercise is considered 
of the most delicate and responsible nature, and is not resorted to, unless the 
case be clear, decisive, and unavoidable.”) (emphasis added)); Cotten v. Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 6 Fla. 610, 613–16 (1856) (“Instances are not lacking to show that the 
judiciary, in essaying to shield the Constitution against the presumed 
aggressions of the Legislature, has itself become the greater aggressor.  Every 
enlightened court will be admonished by these instances, of how delicate a 
character is the duty imposed upon it, when called to decide upon the 
constitutionality of an act of the Legislature.  While it is an essential element in 
the character of an independent judiciary firmly to maintain and resolutely to 
exercise its appropriate powers when properly invoked, it is equally its duty to 
be careful not rashly and inconsiderately to trench upon or invade the precincts 
of the other departments of the government.  That the judicial department is 
the proper power in the government to determine whether a statute be or be not 
constitutional will not, at this day, be questioned. . . . But it is a most grave and 
important power, not to be exercised lightly or rashly. . . .”) (emphasis added); 
Att’y Gen. v. Burbank, 12 Cal. 378, 385 (1859) (“The delicate office of declaring 
an Act of the Legislature unconstitutional and void should never be exercised, 
unless there be a clear repugnancy between the inferior and the organic law”) 
(emphasis added); State ex rel. Morrell v. Fickle, 71 Tenn. 79, 81 (1879) (“The 
duty of the court to pass upon the constitutionality of legislative acts is a very 
grave and responsible one.  Every presumption should be made in favor of the 
validity of the laws.”).  
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3. A Philosophically-Informed Activismometer 
We can combine these ideas about the relationship of 
knowledge and assertion and the relationship of knowledge 
and practical interests into an “activismometer” with 5 levels.  
The levels on both ends correspond to the two ways to breach 
the knowledge norm of assertion (or its close kin): (a) to make 
assertions about the law while remaining confessedly 
agnostic about critical facts (violating Grice’s maxim of 
Quality) or (b) to refuse to make assertions even about 
matters that are able to be known (violating Grice’s maxim of 
Quantity).  These are levels 5 and 1.  Level 1 is, if a court has 
jurisdiction to interpret (and so, authority to enforce) the 
Constitution, too passive, because a court remains silent in 
the face of known or knowable constitutional problems.  Level 
5 is too active, because it makes assertions contrary to the 
elected branches even in the face of agnosticism about critical 
facts. 
Between these two rejections of knowledge as the norm of 
assertion we have courts that accept knowledge as the norm 
of assertion, but see judicial review as a relatively-high-
stakes or relatively-low-stakes proposition.  These are levels 
2, 3, and 4. The three traditional levels of burdens of proof—
beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence, 
and preponderance of the evidence—correspond to decreasing 
levels of the gravity of a pronouncement.  Criminal 
punishment is a high-stakes context, so we require a 
relatively large amount of evidence—sufficient to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt—before we encourage juries to 
make the assertion that criminal defendants are guilty.69
 
 69. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371–72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of these two types of 
erroneous outcomes.  If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial 
were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, there would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing 
guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting 
the innocent.  Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency 
of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard to be 
applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an 
assessment of the comparative social disutility of each.  When one makes such 
an assessment, the reason for different standards of proof in civil, as opposed to 
criminal, litigation becomes apparent.  In a civil suit between two private 
parties for money damages, for example, we view it as no more serious in 
general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant’s favor than for 
there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.  A preponderance of the 
  But 
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compensatory civil liability is a relatively low-stakes context, 
in which less evidence is required (even for the same 
assertion, e.g., “A purposely killed B”).  The termination of 
parental rights70 and civil confinement71 are middle-stakes 
context requiring clear and convincing evidence.  Of course, 
while these three levels of proof are the three levels 
traditionally distinguished by the law, the stakes involved in 
particular contexts, and the amount of evidence we might 
therefore require, lie along a continuum.72
Courts committed to staying at Level 2 activism would 
find constitutional violations only if they are established 
beyond reasonable doubt.  Those at Level 3 would also allow 
judicial assertions of unconstitutionality if they are clear.  
Level 4 activists would allow judicial assertions of 
constitutional violations if shown by a preponderance of the 
 
 
evidence standard therefore seems peculiarly appropriate, for, as explained 
most sensibly, it simply requires the trier of fact ‘to believe that the existence of 
a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before (he) may find in favor of the 
party who has the burden to persuade the (judge) of the fact’s existence.’  In a 
criminal case, on the other hand, we do not view the social disutility of 
convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone 
who is guilty.”) (citations omitted). 
 70. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755, 768 (1982) (“In any given 
proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process 
requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests 
affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be 
distributed between the litigants. . . . [A]t a parental rights termination 
proceeding, a near-equal allocation of risk between the parents and the State is 
constitutionally intolerable.”). 
 71. See Addington v. Tex., 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979) (“[T]he individual’s 
interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of such weight and 
gravity that due process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more 
substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 72. The three chief standards of appellate review—de novo, “clearly 
erroneous” review of judicial factfinding, and “substantial evidence” review of 
juries and agencies—correspond roughly to these three standards.  See United 
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (“A finding is ‘clearly 
erroneous’ when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court 
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.”); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th 
Cir. 1969) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 
107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997) (“If the facts and inferences point so strongly and 
overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable 
men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper.  
On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that 
is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in 
the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the 
motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury.  A mere scintilla 
of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury.”). 
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evidence. 
 Here, then, is our activismometer: 
 
B. Examples of the Five Activismometer Levels 
To recapitulate the story so far: “Knowledge,” the central 
concern of epistemologists, constrains permissible assertion 
and supplies the goal of those in a position to speak to issues.  
Those who speak about the Constitution should stick to what 
they know, but also (if in a position to enforce the 
Constitution) not neglect relevant sources of knowledge.  
Neglecting sources of information relevant to 
constitutionality is the level 1 too-passive error, while forging 
ahead with assertions about the Constitution ignorant of 
relevant details is the level 5 too-active error.  Between these 
two errors lie different assessments of the stakes in judicial 
review, and so of the level of proof required for “knowledge” in 
that context, because knowledge (and thus permissible 
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assertability) are stakes-sensitive.  This part of our 
activismometer is really a spectrum, but I assign the three 
conventional options for burdens of proof—beyond a 
reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence, and 
preponderance of evidence—to levels 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  
1. Level 5: Knowledge-Exceeding Declarations of Law 
Level-5 errors are confessions of ignorance on critical 
facts coupled with the use of judicial power to strike down 
statutes or executive action.  Justice Jackson’s famous 
1952 Youngstown concurrence claimed that the original 
history of executive and legislative power was just too 
enigmatic to be helpful: 
A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the 
poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority 
applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they 
actually present themselves.  Just what our forefathers 
did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen 
modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost 
as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to 
interpret for Pharaoh.  A century and a half of partisan 
debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but 
only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected 
sources on each side of any question.  They largely cancel 
each other.73
Note that Jackson does not begin by rejecting the 
relevance of originalist evidence: he says that the original 
history would have genuine “authority” over his decision if it 
were clear enough.  He then moves on to consider other 
rationales for his decision only because the historical 
materials (and later cases as well) were not clear enough.  
Despite this uncertainty, however, Jackson ultimately voted 
with the majority in striking down the steel seizure. 
  
But insufficient clarity regarding matters that would be 
authoritative if they were clear is simply ignorance of 
relevant considerations.  And if knowledge is a genuine norm 
of assertion—that is, if level 5 is too high on our 
activismometer—ignorance of the relevant considerations 
should end the issue; Truman’s actions should have been 
allowed, absent sufficient knowledge that the actual 
 
 73. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
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Constitution forbade them.  The alternative, of course, is to 
dig into the Helvidius/Pacificus debates and other relevant 
material,74 but unless Jackson is willing to do that, he should 
either (a) explain why that material is irrelevant, i.e., why his 
initial inclination is wrong, or (b) refrain from making 
assertions about the Constitution contrary to Truman’s.75
Roe v. Wade’s famous agnosticism about the beginning of 
life is another classic case: 
 
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life 
begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of 
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at 
any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the 
development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to 
speculate as to the answer. 
If knowledge is the norm of assertion, this should be the 
prelude to deference to elected officials regarding whether 
fetal life is a sufficiently-important interest to justify abortion 
restrictions.  But not for Roe.76
 
 74. See, e.g., ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, THE PACIFICUS-
HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–94: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDING (Morton J. Frisch ed. 2007); MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE 
CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2007). 
 
 75. Matt Estrin in conversation suggests an alternative Level-4 
interpretation of Jackson’s reasoning.  If Jackson genuinely thinks that the 
historical materials are not merely enigmatic, but genuinely in equipoise, and if 
he is searching for the preponderance of evidence, even the slightest bit of 
evidence from other sources would be enough to tip the balance.  Given his 
complete lack of engagement with the history, Jackson certainly wouldn’t be 
justified in claiming that the evidence is in equipoise, but he also doesn’t even 
seem to be claiming that.  Rather, he asserts that it is too hard for him to 
tell how much historical evidence there is on either side of the debate.  Turning 
to other considerations because considerations initially thought to be 
authoritative are too difficult to assess is, of course, the drunk-under-the-
lamppost error. 
 76. Moreover, Roe itself undermines the chief argument for supporting a 
right to abortion notwithstanding possible fetal personhood: Judith Thomson’s 
“violinist” argument from bodily integrity.  See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A 
Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48–49 (1971).  Speaking of 
Fourteenth Amendment personhood, the Court says, “If this suggestion of 
personhood is established, the appellant’s case, of course, collapses, for the 
fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. The 
appellant conceded as much on reargument.”  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–
57 (1973). 
     Thomson would not agree, because the personhood of an aggressor—a 
burglar, say—does not give the aggressor an absolute right not to be killed (or 
forced to evacuate the premises).  There are, to be sure, issues about whether 
the fetus is relevantly similar to a burglar.  But Roe entirely ignores this issue, 
claiming that the status of the fetus would, if resolved in favor of a sufficiently 
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The agnosticism about the relative value of heterosexual 
family environments in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the 
Proposition 8 case, Perry,77 followed by the Second Circuit in 
the DOMA case, Windsor,78
[W]e emphasize the extraordinary significance of the 
official designation of ‘marriage.’  That designation is 
important because ‘marriage’ is the name that society 
gives to the relationship that matters most between two 
adults.  A rose by any other name may smell as sweet, but 
to the couple desiring to enter into a committed lifelong 
relationship, a marriage by the name of ‘registered 
domestic partnership’ does not. . . .  [T]he designation of 
‘marriage’ itself . . . expresses validation, by the state and 
the community, and . . . serves as a symbol, like a wedding 
ceremony or a wedding ring, of something profoundly 
important.
 poses a very similar issue.  The 
Ninth Circuit spoke at length, and persuasively, about the 
symbolic power and social meaning of the word “marriage” to 
the plaintiffs, above and beyond the specific rights regarding 
adoption, hospital visitation, and the like, which gay couples 





high status, settle the case.  Given the later statement of agnosticism about the 
status of the fetus and knowledge as the norm of judicial assertions about the 
Constitution, Roe should have stayed its hand. 
     It is true that the Court’s statement about the case for abortion rights 
collapsing was in the context of constitutional personhood, not the general 
question of when life (or personhood or rights-bearing-status) begins more 
generally; Blackmun states that constitutional personhood begins only at birth, 
while he is agnostic on personhood generally.  However, given the Court’s 
equation of liberty interests with genuine policy interests, Thomson’s 
arguments on the limits to the right to life as a moral matter would presumably 
have led Blackmun—if he recognized those arguments as legitimate—to 
recognize a corresponding limit on the constitutional obligations assuming the 
personhood of the fetus.  At any rate, even aside from whether Blackmun’s 
constitutional-obligation-to-protect-constitutional-persons point undermines 
Thomson’s policy argument, Blackmun does not say anything that would 
suggest any agreement with Thomson.  Of the two possible policy justifications 
for abortion rights, then—(a) fetal non-personhood and (b) even-assuming-
personhood arguments from bodily integrity—Blackmun is explicitly agnostic 
on justification (a), and at best completely unaware of justification (b), at worst 
expressly hostile to (b) when put in the garb of a constitutional obligation. 
 77. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 78. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 
S.Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 79. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1078 (citations omitted). 
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However, when it came to the possible effect of an 
expansion of the word “marriage” to new cases, the court’s 
sensitivity to the dynamics of social meaning suddenly 
disappeared.  Unlike Judge Walker’s decision at the district 
court, which straightforwardly rejected on the merits the 
argument that heterosexual child-rearing environments have 
special qualities worth encouraging,80
We need not decide whether there is any merit to the 
sociological premise of Proponents’ first argument—that 
families headed by two biological parents are the best 
environments in which to raise children—because even if 
Proponents are correct, Proposition 8 had absolutely no 
effect on the ability of same-sex couples to become parents 
or the manner in which children are raised in California.  
As we have explained, Proposition 8 in no way modified 
the state’s laws governing parentage, which are distinct 
from its laws governing marriage.  Both before and after 
Proposition 8, committed opposite-sex couples (“spouses”) 
and same-sex couples (“domestic partners”) had identical 
rights with regard to forming families and raising 
children.  Similarly, Proposition 8 did not alter the 
California adoption or presumed-parentage laws, which 
continue to apply equally to same-sex couples.  In order to 
be rationally related to the purpose of funneling more 
childrearing into families led by two biological parents, 
Proposition 8 would have had to modify these laws in 
some way.  It did not do so.
 the Ninth Circuit 
refused to engage the issue, because it now considered labels 
irrelevant absent a difference in underlying rights: 
81
The positive social meaning of the term “marriage” thus 
seems, in the Ninth Circuit’s view, to have no costs;  
it is a completely free resource.  Courts and commentators 
analyzing trademark dilution cases, however, have seen the 
obvious effect that expansion of a symbol will have on the 
value of the symbol for its original uses, referring to the 
“gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold 





 80. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 980–81, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (making finding of fact and applying it in lack-of-rational-basis context). 
 or to the dilution of the “drawing 
 81. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1086–87 (citations omitted). 
 82. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 
HARV. L. REV. 813, 825 (1926).  In fuller context:  
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power of a congenial symbol.”83
 
  This is not to say, of course, 
that “marriage” is literally a trademark, or even that the sort 
of social-meaning dilution that is presumed in trademark law 
would necessarily impair the value of “marriage” as an 
honorific.  But the social meaning of “Coca Cola” and the 
social meaning of “marriage” might reasonably be taken to 
operate the same way—that is, in a way that is diluted and 
weakened as a term extends to different kinds of products 
and relationships.  If Judge Walker is right, of course, the 
value of “marriage” would be maintained by his decision, 
precisely because, on his view of the facts, homosexual child-
rearing environments are just as good as heterosexual ones.  
But that is the very issue on which the Ninth Circuit claimed 
agnosticism, and the point of knowledge as the norm of 
assertion is that agnosticism is not enough.  I thus 
classify Perry and Windsor as Level 5 instances: breaches of 
knowledge as the norm of assertion. 
 
The real injury in all such cases can only be gauged in the light of what 
has been said concerning the function of a trademark.  It is the gradual 
whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public 
mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods.  The 
more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the 
public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against 
vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in connection with 
which it has been used. 
Id. 
 83. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 
205 (1942).  In fuller context:  
The protection of trade-marks is the law’s recognition of the 
psychological function of symbols.  If it is true that we live by symbols, 
it is no less true that we purchase goods by them.  A trade-mark is a 
merchandising shortcut which induces a purchaser to select what he 
wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants.  The owner of a 
mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to 
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a 
congenial symbol.  Whatever the means employed, the aim is the 
same—to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential 
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears.  
Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value.  If 
another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has 
created, the owner can obtain legal redress. 
Id. 
GREEN FINAL 5/23/2014  12:44 PM 
2014] THE ACTIVISMOMETER 441 
2. Levels 2, 3, and 4: No-Reasonable-Doubt, Clarity, and 
Preponderance Standards 
Dialing down to the middle part of our activismometer, 
we find those who adhere to knowledge as the norm of 
assertion, but who use different thresholds for what  
counts as “knowledge.”  Traditionally, the law uses three chief 
standards—preponderance of the evidence, clear and 
convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt—
but these categories are neither perfectly distinct from each 
other nor perfectly clear. 
I will note in passing two ways in which these concepts 
are not perfectly clear, so that we may avoid confusion in the 
application of these labels.  First, is the inquiry regarding 
“reasonable doubt” a hypothetical inquiry—the doubt of any 
reasonable person—or does it refer to actual doubts of the 
particular interpreter or factfinder (i.e., the particular judge 
exercising judicial review, or particular jury finding criminal 
guilt)?  Interpreters like James Bradley Thayer use the 
concept to refer to hypothetical reasonable persons, and at 
least some courts use similar language.84  However, if a “no 
reasonable doubt” standard is confined to the doubts of a 
particular interpreter, it is actually a less demanding 
standard of proof than a simple “no doubt” standard, because 
only reasonable doubts now need apply.85
 
 84. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (“It [the court] 
can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have 
not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one, —so clear that it is 
not open to rational question.  That is the standard of duty to which the courts 
bring legislative Acts; that is the test which they apply, —not merely their own 
judgment as to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to what judgment is 
permissible to another department which the constitution has charged with the 
duty of making it.  This rule recognizes that, having regard to the great, 
complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much which will seem 
unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to 
another; that the constitution often admits of different interpretations; that 
there is often a range of choice and judgment; that in such cases the 
constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but 
leaves open this range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is 
constitutional.”); Grimball v. Ross, 1 Ga. Cases 63, 64–65, T.U.P. Charlt. 175, 
178–79 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1808) (“ought to be as obvious to the comprehension of 
everyone, as an axiomatic truth”).  
 
 85. James Whitman’s history of the theological origins of the reasonable-
doubt rule suggests that the rule was adopted to make convictions easier, 
relative to an “any doubt” rule, by soothing the consciences of jurors afraid of 
convicting an innocent man.  JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE 
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Second, at what time is clarity to be assessed under a 
clear-and-convincing standard?  If clarity is to be considered 
at the time a legislature acts, the standard of evidence will be 
much more demanding than if it is to be considered in the 
light of later judicial clarification by further analysis and 
research.  The existence of a clarity standard confined to the 
time of legislation would make the judicial task much easier, 
but if courts are required to exert themselves to make 
constitutional requirements as clear as possible, that will be a 
lot of work.86
Level-2 activism is articulated in Justice Bushrod 
Washington’s separate opinion—one of several seriatim 
opinions, with Marshall in dissent for 3 justices on the basic 
issue—in Ogden v. Saunders: 
 
It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, 
and the patriotism of the legislative body, by which any 
law is passed, to presume in favour of its validity, until its 
violation of the Constitution is proved beyond all 
reasonable doubt.87
Washington claims that “[t]his has always been the 
language of this Court, when that subject has called for its 
decision,”
 
88 but without citation; Ogden seems to be the first 
use of such language at the U.S. Supreme Court.89
A level-3 clear-and-convincing standard for activism is 
exemplified by Marshall’s opinion in Fletcher v. Peck: 
 
The question, whether a law be void for its repugnancy to 
the Constitution, is, at all times, a question of much 
delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the 
affirmative, in a doubtful case.  The court, when impelled 
by duty to render such a judgment, would be unworthy of 
its station, could it be unmindful of the solemn obligations 
 
DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 114–24 (2008).  That 
suggests that the inquiry is not a search for hypothetical reasonable people who 
might have doubts, but an examination of our actual doubts to see if they are 
reasonable. 
 86. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 87. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827) (opinion of 
Washington, J.). 
 88. Id. 
 89. In works in progress I survey other historical examples.  The earliest 
instances that I have found are Grimball, 1 Ga. Cases 63, 64–65 and 
Commonwealth ex rel. O’Hara v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117, 123 (Pa. 1811) (Tilghman, 
C.J.).  The next state supreme court to adopt the language was apparently In re 
Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 95 (Mass. 1834). 
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which that station imposes.  But it is not on slight 
implication and vague conjecture that the Legislature is to 
be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts 
to be considered as void.  The opposition between the 
Constitution and the law should be such that the judge 
feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility 
with each other.90
To keep our activismometer levels clear and distinct, it is 
helpful to distinguish between what Marshall means by 
“doubtful case” and what later interpreters like Thayer have 
taken him to mean by it.
 
91  A “doubtful case” refers to doubts 
in the judge’s own mind.  For Marshall in Fletcher, “the 
judge” is the one who must “feel[] a clear and strong 
conviction of their incompatibility.”  If “no reasonable doubt” 
likewise refers to subjective, actual doubt, it actually allows 
judicial review more liberally than a “no doubt” rule taken 
literally.92
Level 4 activism, requiring only a preponderance of the 
evidence for judicial review, is advocated particularly clearly 
by Professor Steven Calabresi:  
  I have arranged the activismometer, however, on 
the theory that reasonable doubt means doubt in a reasonable 
person other than the judge. 
Since judgments of constitutionality are made by all three 
branches of the federal government acting together, a law 
that arrives in court with the imprimatur of two of the 
three branches should be presumed to be constitutional.  
And, the courts should be restrained in striking the law 
down except where it appears by a preponderance of the 
evidence to conflict with the Constitution.  I would not go 
as far as James Bradley Thayer and invalidate only laws 
that are clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt 
unconstitutional.  But I do think the burden of proof lies 
on those who are challenging the constitutionality of a law 
or of an executive branch action.93
 
 90. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810). 
 
 91. See Thayer, supra note 84, at 145 (appealing to Marshall’s “doubtful 
case” language for support). 
 92. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 93. Steven G. Calabresi, Introduction: A Critical Introduction to the 
Originalism Debate, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 22 
(Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).  Gary Lawson and Christopher Moore offer a 
more extended argument against deference, which they concede is in the teeth 
of most early commentators on judicial review, though they do not explicitly 
advocate a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.  See Gary Lawson & 
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I have found, however, no early instances of courts—even 
with a very liberal approach to “early”—adopting such a view.  
A requirement that constitutional violations be clear and 
convincing or something more substantial seems to be 
universal among early courts discussing the issue of judicial 
deference to legislative judgments.  It is true that some courts 
discuss judicial review without affirmatively mentioning a 
clarity requirement—Marbury is an instance—but none 
consider and reject one.  If we treat the state-constitutional 
standards as a laboratory and give more weight to earlier 
evidence as most probative of what “judicial power” expressed 
in the Constitution, it seems most reasonable to say that our 
activismometer should be set either at level 2 or level 3, and 
probably level 3.  My historical conclusion, however, is quite 
tentative. 
3. Level 1: Deliberate Ignorance of Relevant 
Considerations 
Activismometer level 1 is the deliberate failure to 
consider evidence relevant to a statute’s constitutionality in a 
case in which a court has jurisdiction to assess it.  The 
approach to the presumption of constitutionality taken in 
1931 in O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance, in 
which the Court said that, in order to sustain a statute, it 
would assume the legislative fact-finding necessary to sustain 
the distinctions drawn in legislation, even where the 
legislature itself found no such facts, is such an example.94
Compare the situation with criminal self-defense 
justifications.  A criminal defendant who wants a jury to be 
able to consider the issue of whether his actions are justified 
(say, in killing someone) must present some evidence in order 
to receive a jury instruction on self-defense.  A criminal 
defendant who supplies no evidence to show he was justified 
is treated as unjustified.  Moreover, even if the defendant 
  
The Court refused to make any inference at all from the 
legislative silence on the relevant justificatory facts.  That 
failure, however, is profoundly relevant to whether the 
legislature’s distinction was in fact justified. 
 
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1275–78 (1996). 
 94. See O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 
257–58 (1931). 
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produces evidence at trial that his actions were justified, most 
reasonable observers would think it suspicious if that 
defendant had never told that story before trial. Griffin v. 
California95 and Doyle v. Ohio,96
When O’Gorman is used in the context of a legislature 
who adopts a legislative distinction without actually 
articulating any facts that could justify that distinction, it 
operates like a Griffin or Doyle rule for the government’s 
justifications for its statutes, shorn of any Fifth Amendment 
anti-self-incrimination rationale.  Under O’Gorman, courts 
use the presumption of constitutionality as a “fact-finding” 
tool—really, a device for suppressing adverse inferences from 
the government’s failure to justify a distinction at the proper 
time.  Indeed, when O’Gorman is used to find facts when the 
government has failed to articulate its justification even after 
the fact, it goes far beyond even Griffin and Doyle, because it 
operates to suppress the adverse inference from the 
government’s failure to justify its distinctions at any time, 
akin to a rule requiring the prosecution to disprove 
justification defenses on which the criminal defendant has 
offered no evidence at all. 
 to be sure, protect criminal 
defendants against such adverse inferences.  But those rules 
are not rooted in the fact that inferences from silence are, as a 
general matter, irrational or unreliable.  Rather, they are 
rooted in the particular circumstances of an individual 
testifying in own defense and the desire to protect arrestees 
from implicit pressure to talk to the police. 
The failure to draw reasonable inferences from 
governmental silence in defense of its own statutes is not the 
proper application of a high burden of proof (i.e., Level 2 
activism), but instead an instance of deliberate ignorance 
(i.e., Level 1 excess passivity).  Deliberate ignorance is of 
course sometimes a good idea—self-incrimination and the 
exclusionary rule may be instances, and respect for others’ 
privacy is obviously another—but judicial review does not 
seem to be one of them. 
The model of self-defense justifications in the criminal 
law shows why departing from O’Gorman need not take us 
any higher than Level 2 on our activismometer.  The criminal 
 
 95. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 96. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
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defendant has a burden of production with respect to 
explaining his justification defense—that is, he is subject to 
an adverse inference from the failure to produce such 
evidence.  But under most states’ approach, once the 
defendant produces some evidence on the issue, the 
prosecution still retains the burden of showing guilt—i.e., 
disproving the self-defense justification, if offered—beyond a 
reasonable doubt.97
Another way to get stuck at Level 1 is to fail to see the 
contingency of clarity or plainness.  Questions that initially 
seem unclear can frequently become clear with sufficient 
research and analysis.
  Whether to be at Level 2, 3, or 4 is an 
issue of how much evidence is required to show 
unconstitutionality, but the O’Gorman issue is whether 
legislative silence itself counts as evidence that can help meet 
that burden.  Ignoring relevant silence is staying at Level 1; 
we can pay attention to it but still require unconstitutionality 
to be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus go no higher 
than Level 2. 
98  The existence of a relatively high 
burden of proof is, therefore, not way for judges to decide 
cases more easily, but instead a reason for judges to consider 
cases and search the mines of historical materials more 
diligently.  Many of the early cases establishing clarity or 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirements for judicial review 
state at the same time that this relatively high burden of 
proof should impel judges to work harder, rather than 
concluding prematurely that the task is impossible.  Many 
early courts insist that courts have a duty to consider 
constitutional questions long and carefully, despite the 
existence of a deferential standard.99
 
 97. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 351 N.E.2d 88, 108 (Ohio 1976). 
  The clear majority rule 
 98. The Supreme Court’s recent case on the timing of plain-error review, 
Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121 (2013), presupposed that 
constitutional issues that are not plain at the time of a trial-court’s error might 
become plain by the time of an appeal.  The Court found that the later time was 
relevant, a result analogous to the time-of-later-judicial-assessment rule for a 
judicial review clear-error deference rule.  Id. at 1127 (allowing plain error in 
“case where the error was unclear at the time of trial but becomes clear on 
appeal because the applicable law has been clarified.” (quoting United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). 
 99. See, e.g., Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236, 245 (Md. 1802) (“[issue 
must be] fully discussed by counsel learned in the law, and the court decide on 
mature consideration.”); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (1 Litt.) 90, 94 (1822) 
(“[issue must receive] the most mature and deliberate consideration of the 
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is that courts are to work hard to meet the demanding 
standard of proof, not simply note that it is difficult and give 
up in advance.100
James Bradley Thayer, however, harshly criticized 
Daniel Webster for making exactly this point in the Charles 
River Bridge case of 1829, accusing him of denying the rule of 




court”); In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 95 (1834) (Shaw, C.J.) (“[W]hen 
called upon to pronounce the invalidity of an act of legislation . . . courts will 
approach the question with great caution, examine it in every possible aspect, 
and ponder upon it as long as deliberation and patient attention can throw any 
new light on the subject . . .”); Landon v. Litchfield, 11 Conn. 251, 265–66 (1836) 
(“[legislation not to be overturned] by an immatured judicial opinion . . .[and] 
courts . . . shall carefully review former decisions . . .”); Cotten v. Leon Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 6 Fla. 610, 613 (1856) (stating that courts have “duty to be careful not 
rashly and inconsiderately to trench upon or invade the precincts of the other 
departments of the government”); Rich v. Flanders, 39 N.H. 304, 312 (1859) 
(same language as Wellington); THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST . . . 182 (1868) (same language 
as Wellington); Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534, 543 (1883) (nothing that 
judicial review requires “approaching the question involved in this case with 
great caution and delicacy” and “careful examination”; “that presumption [of 
constitutionality] is not only not conclusive, but it is not so strong as to prevent 
a free and full enquiry into the subject . . .”); Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 
258, 263 (Wyo. 1900) (stating that reliance on statute “is not to preclude a 
careful investigation of the serious question presented . . .”). 
  Webster argued, 
     For two of the very few cases using a presumption of constitutionality as a 
basis for judicial passivity, both trial courts, see Grimball, 1 Ga. Cases 63, 64–
65 (“[N]o nice doctrines, no critical exposition of words, no abstract rules of 
interpretation, such as may fit the elucidation of principles in a legal contest 
between individuals, can, or rather ought, to be resorted to in deciding on the 
constitutional operation of a statute.  This violation of a constitutional right 
ought to be as obvious to the comprehension of everyone, as an axiomatic truth; 
as that the parts are equal to the whole.”); Byrne’s Adm’rs v. Stewart’s Adm’rs, 
3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des. Eq.) 466, 476–77 (1812) (“This confidence in the wisdom and 
integrity of the legislature, is necessary to ensure a due obedience to its 
authority; for if this is frequently questioned, it must tend to diminish that 
reverence for the laws which is essential to the public safety and happiness.  I 
am not, therefore, disposed to examine with scrupulous exactness the validity of 
a law . . . The validity of a law ought not, then, to be questioned, unless it is so 
obviously repugnant to the constitution, that when pointed out by the Judges, 
all men of sense and reflection in the community may perceive the 
repugnancy.”). 
 100. For more on this issue, see John McGinnis, Is Judicial Restraint Part of 
the Originalist Method?, Presented at the Fourth Annual Hugh and Hazel 
Darling Foundation Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference at the 
University of San Diego Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism 
(Feb. 15–16, 2013), available at http://www.sandiego.edu/law/school/events/ 
webcasts/2013.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
 101. Thayer, supra note 84, at 145–46.  Amazingly, Professor Thayer then 
immediately cites Wellington on the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard of 
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Some general remarks have been made, to show the 
solicitude of courts not to overturn a legislative act unless 
its unconstitutionality is manifest.  Certainly if a judge 
has doubts, they will weigh in favor of the act.  But it 
should be considered, that all cases of this sort will involve 
some doubt; for it is not to be supposed that the legislature 
will pass an act which is palpably unconstitutional.  The 
correct ground is this, that the Court shall interfere and 
declare an act to be void, where the case, which may have 
been doubtful, shall be made out to be clear by 
examination.102
Note the tense of Webster’s descriptions: though the case 
“may have been doubtful,” it may yet later “be made out to be 
clear by examination.”  Webster is not arguing that courts 
should strike down legislation while they still have doubts 
about its unconstitutionality; rather, doubts are to be 
dissolved by careful examination of the relevant evidence.  
Such a duty of examination is simply the Gricean duty of 
Quantity—obtaining and supplying information about 
constitutional requirements when conversationally 
appropriate.  In urging courts to neglect this duty, Thayer 
thus advocates inappropriate Level 1 judicial passivity. 
 
C. Different Proper Activismometer Settings for Different 
Kinds of Judicial Review? 
Not all judicial review of elected branches’ actions is 
necessarily subject to the same standard.  In a historical 
sequel to this paper, I will assess several distinctions that 
might be made.  Are state legislatures due the same 
deference as Congress?  Thayer’s approach to judicial review 
was limited to Congress,103 a sentiment echoed by Justice 
Holmes’s dictum that the Union could survive the lack of 
judicial review, but not the lack of federal supremacy over 
state laws.104
 
deference as if it refutes Webster’s point, without noting Chief Justice Lemuel 
Shaw’s statement of the extreme care with which courts must examine 
constitutional questions, rather than simply assessing the situation from the 
legislature’s perspective.  See In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) at 95. 
  The earliest statements of enhanced burdens of 
 102. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 24 
Mass. (7 Pick.) 344, 449–50 (1829). 
 103. Thayer, supra note 84, at 154 (stating that federal courts reviewing 
conflict between state legislation and federal constitution is “a different matter” 
from reviewing act of Congress). 
 104. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court: Speech at a Dinner of the 
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proof for judicial review in federal cases concern state 
legislation—Fletcher and Ogden, for instance—while the 
earliest instances in which Congress’s legislation was 
reviewed—McCulloch and Marbury—have no such explicit 
statement.105
III. VAGUENESS 
  In the case of McCulloch, that may be because 
there were two conflicting elected actors—the legislatures of 
Maryland, attacking the Bank, and Congress, setting it up—
at issue.  A survey of cases involving such conflicts and how 
courts handle them would likely produce different standards 
of proof, or perhaps a more complicated inquiry into 
comparative deference for the two conflicting elected actors.  
Cases of conflict between executive and legislative 
constitutional claims present similar issues and would 
deserve a separate historical canvass. 
Vagueness—the existence of fuzzy boundaries at the 
edges of constitutional concepts—is Larry Solum106 and 
Randy Barnett’s107 chief instance of the sort of phenomenon 
that must be accommodated by “constitutional construction,” 
which they (with Keith Whittington,108 as well as others) use 
to refer to the aspects of constitutional adjudication not 
governed by constitutional interpretation.109
 
Harvard Law School Association of New York, February 15, 1913, in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL 
OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 147 
(Richard A. Posner ed., 1997) (“I do not think the United States would come to 
an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void.  I do think the 
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws 
of the several states.”). 
  Because I 
 105. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 106. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 95, 97–98 (2010). 
 107. See BARNETT, supra note 36, at 118–30; Randy Barnett, Interpretation 
and Construction, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011). 
 108. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (2001). 
 109. It is interesting that Justice Scalia, despite his disparagement of the 
interpretation-construction distinction, see Scalia, supra note 13, at 14–15, 
nonetheless acknowledges that vagueness is an important phenomenon, distinct 
from the problem of ambiguity.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 84–85 
(“Usually . . . the change produced by nonoriginalists gives a different meaning 
to provisions that are not ambiguous but vague.”).  McGinnis and Rappaport 
likewise acknowledge the existence of vagueness, even as they advocate 
resolving it with rules they deem interpretive.  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
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distinguish my principles of judicial restraint from the 
interpretive issues at stake in the originalism controversy, 
these principles of restraint likewise are placed in the 
“construction” category, if we are not using “interpretation” 
broadly to encompass all issues pertaining to adjudication. 
Principles of judicial restraint can help solve the problem 
of vagueness as it arises in constitutional adjudication if we 
take certain views of the general phenomenon of vagueness.  
While vagueness has attracted a lot of attention from legal 
theorists, it has attracted an enormous amount more from 
philosophers.  Timothy Williamson—he of forementioned 
knowledge-as-the-norm-of-assertion fame, though this is 
other, earlier work—has popularized the epistemic view of 
vagueness.110  The idea is that there is some particular 
number of hairs that will cause Harry to be bald,111
 
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and 
the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 773 (2009) (“[T]he 
evidence that we have found suggests that interpreters believed that ambiguity 
and vagueness could be resolved through the applicable interpretive rules, and 
thus through originalist methods.”).  Like Barnett and Solum but unlike 
McGinnis and Rappaport, I am inclined to use the term “interpretation” to refer 
only to the process of extracting meaning from a text, and some other term to 
refer to the methods by which we resolve vagueness in that meaning.  However, 
like McGinnis and Rappaport but (apparently) unlike Barnett and Solum, I am 
inclined to use the methods of resolving vagueness that were prevalent at the 
framing, because those methods would likely reflect the meaning expressed in 
terms like “judicial power,” “legislative power,” and “executive power.” 
 but one 
     It is also striking that Timothy Endicott, though he criticizes epistemic 
theories of vagueness for denying the existence of genuine indeterminacy in 
language, see TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN THE LAW 99–136 (2001), 
also presents vagueness in terms of clarity.  See id. at 2 (explaining ‘higher-
order’ vagueness as the vagueness of phrases like ‘clear case’ and ‘borderline 
case’). 
 110. TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS (1994).  Moreover, Grice is among 
the many philosophers who have also explained vagueness in epistemic terms.  
See GRICE, supra note 41, at 151–52 (“Should we say . . . that we would not 
know whether to say that it would be correct or to say that it would be incorrect 
to apply the expression ‘cauliflower’ to roses (that is, that the situation would 
fall within the margin of vagueness between ‘being correct’ and ‘being incorrect’ 
 . . .) (emphasis added); see id. at 177 (“To say that an expression is vague (in a 
broad sense of vague) is presumably, roughly speaking, to say that there are 
cases (actual or possible) in which one just does not know whether to apply the 
expression or to withhold it, and one’s not knowing is not due to ignorance of the 
facts.  For instance one may not know whether or not to describe a particular 
man as ‘bald’; and it may be of no help at all to be told exactly how many hairs 
he has on his head.”) (emphases added). 
 111. Or bald-to-degree-1, if we are using scalar degrees of baldness to better 
match ordinary English use the term, which would describe some people as only 
“somewhat bald,” i.e., bald to a degree between 0 and 1. 
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fewer hair would render him not bald.112
Barnett and Solum present their paradigm cases of 
vagueness in terms of a lack of clarity.  Barnett says, 
“Drafters who, perhaps for political reasons, wish to avoid 
appearing to endorse a controversial result in a particular 
situation may use a phrase whose meaning is sufficiently 
‘fuzzy at the edges’ that it is unclear whether or not it would 
reach that result.”
  There is such a 
number; we just don’t know what it is. 
113  Solum says, “There are persons who are 
clearly tall and clearly not tall, but there are also borderline 
cases.”114
While exclusively-epistemic views of vagueness have not 
caught on nearly as well as Williamson’s views about the 
relationship of knowledge and assertion, the theory seems to 
produce satisfying results when applied to vagueness in 
constitutional interpretation.  Consider an instance of 
vagueness in the law as I see it: my anti-outlier view of the 
fundamental rights component of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.
  If our no-assertion-without-knowledge and no-
knowledge-without-sufficient-evidence-given-the-stakes 
principles tell us what to do about lack of clarity in general, 




 112. Or not bald-to-degree-1. 
  Exactly how many states must give a 
particular privilege to their citizens for that privilege to count 
as a “privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States,” 
which all states must respect?  Well, it’s vague, which is to 
say, I don’t know.  28 out of 50 would clearly not be enough; 
48 out of 50 would clearly be enough.  In between I have 
varying levels of certainty.  And depending on the stakes, my 
requisite level of certainly might vary.  The line is uncertain, 
and as we approach it, we lose bits of confidence.  48 states?  
Definitely yes.  47 states?  Definitely yes.  46 states?  
Definitely yes.  45?  Well, pretty definitely yes.  At some 
point, I know not quite where, my confidence level will slip 
below the confidence level I need for judicial review.  Lack of 
 113. BARNETT, supra note 36, at 118. 
 114. Solum, supra note 106106, at 98. 
 115. CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR 
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE: INTEGRATING EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, FUNDAMENTAL CIVIL 
RIGHTS, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1658010. 
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knowledge about precisely when we lack knowledge matches 
Williamson’s view of higher-order vagueness.116
What if Williamson’s account of vagueness is paired  
with the activismometer?  In that case, we can only 
legitimately assert that something is a privilege of citizens of 
the United States—and thus, only strike down statutes on 
that basis—if we are far enough away from the boundary line 
that we meet the stakes-sensitive standard for knowledge.  
Relatively activist courts by my definition—that is, who view 
judicial review as a relatively low-stakes proposition—will be 
willing to go closer to the line.  Resolving issues of vagueness 
thus involves (a) deciding how much clarity is required for 
judicial review—i.e., where on our activismometer we should 
be on the Level-2-to-Level-4 spectrum—and (b) reserving 
judicial review for cases far enough away from the blurry 
boundary line to achieve that level of clarity.  This isn’t a 
terribly exciting account of how to respond to vagueness, of 
course, but theories of judicial restraint should probably 
strive to be mundane. 
 
IV. INTERBRANCH ISSUES AND A DEFENSE OF ENFORCE-BUT-
DON’T-DEFEND 
Does judicial restraint necessarily increase legislative 
and executive flexibility?  We might think so; less judicial 
review seems to leave more room for other branches to 
operate.  But my theory of judicial restraint—limiting judicial 
assertions about the Constitution to occasions when a court 
has knowledge, judged by the proper stakes-sensitive 
standard without neglecting sources of relevant evidence—
does not mean that legislatures are free from similar 
obligations.  Thomas Cooley has a nice statement of the 
applicability of restraint principles to all three branches of 
government in his 1868 treatise: 
But when all the legitimate lights for ascertaining the 
meaning of the Constitution have been made use of, it 
may still happen that the construction is a matter of 
doubt.  In such a case it seems clear that everyone called 
to act where, in his opinion, the proposed action would be 
 
 116. Put in epistemic modal logic terms, it amounts to the denial of the “4” 
axiom, ☐p☐☐p, with “☐” representing knowledge. See Modal Logic, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_logic. 
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of doubtful constitutionality, is bound from that doubt 
alone to abstain from acting.  Whoever derives his power 
from the Constitution to perform any public function, is 
disloyal to that instrument, and grossly derelict in duty, if 
he does that which he is not reasonably satisfied the 
Constitution permits.  Whether the power be legislative, 
executive, or judicial, there is manifest disregard of 
constitutional and moral obligation by one who, having 
taken an oath to observe that instrument, takes part in an 
action which he cannot say he believes to be no violation of 
its provisions.  A doubt of the constitutionality of any 
proposed legislative enactment should in any case be 
reason sufficient for refusing to adopt it; and, if legislators 
do not act upon this principle, the reasons upon which are 
based the judicial decisions sustaining legislation in very 
many cases will cease to be of force.117
If the mere act of legislation is an implicit assertion that 
the legislation is constitutional, then we can use the interest-
sensitivity of knowledge and knowledge as the norm of 
assertion to construct a legislative activismometer as well.  
Legislatures might remain too passive by failing to conduct 
an investigation into evidence relevant to their constitutional 
responsibilities (legislative activismometer level 1, too low).  
They might remain confessedly ignorant of whether 
legislation is constitutional, but pass it anyway, leaving it to 
the courts to decide (legislative activismometer level 5, too 
high).  Finally, they might apply different standards of proof 
to the conclusion that their own actions are constitutional 
(beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing, or 
preponderance of the evidence, levels 2, 3, and 4). 
 
Because the stakes in judges striking down legislation 
might not be the same as the stakes in legislatures passing 
legislation, the proper levels on the two activismometers 
might not be the same.  Indeed, there are strong distinctions 
between the cases of legislative and judicial action; the 
concern of judicial finality, which motivated Iredell to impose 
a “beyond dispute”/“not doubtful” limit on judicial review in 
his 1787 correspondence with Spaight, and which motivated 
the Supreme Court to impose a clear-and-convincing 
requirement for loss of parental rights in Santosky v. 
 
 117. COOLEY, supra note 99, at 73–74. 
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Kramer,118 would not apply to most cases of legislation.119
Further, there might be different proper levels on the 
legislative activismometer—or a different assessment of the 
threshold is-there-an-implicit-assertion-here-at-all issue—for 
rights and powers.  Perhaps a legislature passing a law is 
implicitly asserting that the law is within the legislature’s 
constitutional power, but not implicitly asserting that the law 
does not violate anyone’s constitutional rights.
 
120
One consequence of the legislative duty to consider 
constitutional questions, and not to act if in doubt that their 
actions are constitutional, is that a legislature might 
misbehave by passing legislation that only might be 
constitutional—as opposed to legislation the legislature 
knows is constitutional—and courts would, if the situation is 
not any clearer by the time of judicial review, properly allow 
it to stand because, after all, it might be constitutional.  Of 
course, as noted above, courts would take the legislative 
failure to properly digest the constitutional question as both a 
reason to consider the issue quite carefully themselves, and 
as the grist for a negative inference on relevant facts that 
might help make unconstitutionality of legislation sufficiently 
clear.  But the possible paradox, if it is a paradox, remains: it 
might be that legislatures clearly misbehave (by failing to 
  The level of 
proof required with respect to those two issues could also 
differ. 
 
 118. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 119. In some cases, however, judicial review would probably not be available, 
for instance if no one would be likely to have standing to challenge legislation, 
perhaps because its effects are secret.  See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. 
Ct. 1138, 1154 (2013) (finding no standing based on a fear of being wiretapped) 
(“[T]he assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would 
have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”) (citation omitted). 
 120. Gary Lawson sharply distinguishes powers from rights.  Lawson, supra 
note 55, at 426 (“If the federal government has satisfied its initial burden of 
proof by showing that it has the enumerated power to act, then the burden of 
proof would naturally shift to the person who is claiming that the Constitution 
affirmatively forbids that which the government has done.  The person 
challenging the government action—saying, ‘No, you can’t do this because 
there’s a provision in the Constitution that says that you can’t’—becomes the 
asserter, and hence assumes the burden of proof, and hence the burden of 
indeterminacy.  If one cannot establish (given the appropriate standard of proof) 
the meaning of a rights-bearing provision of the Constitution, such as a 
provision of the Bill of Rights, then anyone who seeks to rely on that provision 
will lose, as that person is now making an insupportable claim about what the 
text allows.”). 
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consider constitutional issues) even if they do not clearly act 
unconstitutionally.  Judicial review under Level 3 activism is 
limited to clearly unconstitutional laws, not clear instances of 
legislative Level 5 error—i.e., cases where the legislature 
went ahead and legislated, heedless of whether a statute was 
constitutional.121
Similarly for executive action: does the taking of 
executive action implicitly assert that the action is 
constitutional, and if so, how much proof of constitutionality 
is required?  We can also have a special activismometer for 
executive review—that is, executive action finding statutes 
unconstitutional.  We could thus have executive-action and 
executive-review activismometers.  Indeed, as Federalist 
78 seems to contemplate (the judiciary “must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy 
of its judgments”), we might also have executive 
constitutional review of judicial decrees, and again different 
standards to govern it—an executive-judgment-enforcement 
activismometer.  Those horrified at the prospect of such a 
power might limit it to super-super-clear cases.  Judicial, 
executive, or legislative supremacy can thus come in degrees. 
 
The distinction between our judicial-review and 
executive-review activismometers supplies a possible 
foundation for the Obama Administration’s enforce-but-don’t-
defend (EBDD) approach to the constitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).122
 
 121. That is, I understand judicial review as making an assertion about the 
Constitution itself, not just an assertion about the legislature’s duty with 
respect to the Constitution.  See supra note 
  If judicial review 
58 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation 
Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html (“[T]he President 
has instructed the Department not to defend the statute [DOMA] in Windsor 
and Pedersen, now pending in the Southern District of New York and the 
District of Connecticut.  I concur in this determination. Notwithstanding this 
determination, the President has informed me that Section 3 will continue to be 
enforced by the Executive Branch.  To that end, the President has instructed 
Executive agencies to continue to comply with Section 3 of DOMA, consistent 
with the Executive’s obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, 
unless and until Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a 
definitive verdict against the law’s constitutionality.  This course of action 
respects the actions of the prior Congress that enacted DOMA, and it recognizes 
the judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.”).  For 
criticism, see, e.g., Michael Ramsey, Standing and Gay Marriage, THE 
ORIGINALISM BLOG (Dec. 13, 2012), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/ 
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requires a smaller degree of proof than executive review, and 
the administration thought the level of proof fell between 
those two thresholds—enough for judicial review, not enough 
for executive review—then the administration could take a 
position in favor of a court striking down the law, even 
though unwilling to refuse enforcement on constitutional 
grounds.  Such a resolution would be akin to a compensate-
but-don’t-imprison (CBDI) policy when evidence falls between 
civil and criminal standards of proof.123
If executive review requires even a minimal amount of 
proof, then the implicit-assertions-of-constitutionality-from-
executive-action trigger for the executive-action 
activismometer must be limited, perhaps to situations in 
which executive officials have discretion under statutes.  
Imagine a case in which the legislature tells the executive to 
do X, and executive officials are unsure whether X is 
constitutional.  If simply doing X—i.e., obeying the statute—
is the implicit assertion that X is constitutional, and 
executive officials don’t know that (by whatever standard), 
then the mere existence of such uncertainty would be warrant 
for executive review in refusing to enforce a statute on 
constitutional grounds.  That would be inconsistent with the 
need for knowledge of unconstitutionality in order to exercise 
executive review.  Sufficiently poor information to support 




(“[T]his procedural mess is entirely the fault of the Obama administration, 
which I think is acting unconstitutionally (or at least, improperly) in enforcing 
the statute in the first place but then refusing to defend it.  Either the President 
thinks the statute is unconstitutional, in which case he should not enforce it, or 
the executive branch thinks the statute is (or may be) constitutional, in which 
case he should enforce and defend it.  That follows from, among other things, 
the President’s oath to ‘preserve, protect and defend the Constitution’ (Art. II, 
Sec. 1).  It’s inexcusable, in my judgment, for the President to take Windsor’s 
money, and then say that the law by which he took her money is 
unconstitutional.”). 
 123. At the DOMA oral argument in Windsor, Chief Justice Roberts asked 
why the president did not have the “courage of his convictions.”  See Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 12, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 
12-307), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument 
_transcripts/12-307_c18e.pdf. EBDD would make sense, though, if the president 
had mid-range convictions on the constitutional issue.  Justice Scalia suggested 
the president had decided that DOMA was not “not so unconstitutional that [he 
was] not willing to enforce it.”  Id. at 21.  But the scalarity could be epistemic, 
not ontological: DOMA was not so clearly unconstitutional, perhaps, that the 
president was not willing to enforce it. 
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produce a conflict between the knowledge-required-for-
executive-review and knowledge-required-for-executive-action 
norms. 
Limits on which executive actions count as implicit 
assertions of such actions’ constitutionality correspond to the 
limits on the Gricean Quantity maxim.  Speakers are only 
obligated to supply information to the extent of the “current 
purposes of the exchange,”124
Intra-executive distributions of interpretive 
responsibility and authority are even clearer examples of the 
not-my-job defense to charges of constitutional 
unfaithfulness.  Privates in the Army, for instance, are not 
implicitly asserting the constitutionality of their conduct 
pursuant to the President’s orders, simply in virtue of their 
actions executing those orders.  In particular cases there 
might be a duty not to follow orders, of course, but the entire 
concept of being a subordinate in the executive branch means 
that following orders is not ipso facto agreeing with them.  
The judicial branch, too, has a hierarchy of courts, with a 
distribution of interpretive responsibility and authority 
among them.  The jury, too, might be authorized or 
 and the obligation to make 
assertions about the Constitution, simply from the existence 
of executive action, would similarly be limited to cases where 
the legislature has not already taken responsibility for the 
constitutionality of an action.  If executive review requires 
sufficient evidence, and it is possible for that burden not to be 
met, then the obligation to speak to constitutional issues 
must be limited to cases when executive action does not 
contradict statutory requirements.  If failing to act would 
contradict what a statute requires, and if it is possible for an 
executive official to lack sufficient evidence to do that (i.e., to 
fail to enforce the statute), then it would be perverse to 
require the executive to have, in all cases, sufficient evidence 
of the constitutionality of its own actions in order to comply 
with the statute.  Executive officials need at least the 
theoretical power to pass the constitutional buck to Congress 
in appropriate cases: the power to say that deciding the 
constitutionality even of the official’s own actions is, in the 
absence of adequate evidence, not the official’s job, but 
Congress’s. 
 
 124. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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responsible for making determinations related to 
constitutionality; there is nothing necessarily wrong with 
judges refraining from judgment, or even investigation, in 
areas that are constitutionally assigned to others.  In short, 
jurisdictional limits—limits on the authority and 
responsibility to speak about the law, and therefore to obtain 
knowledge about it as best one can—are pervasive in our 
constitutional scheme.125
One consequence of this conclusion is that Marbury’s 
oath argument
 
126 must be combined with others, such as the 
province-and-duty-to-say-what-the-law-is argument,127 in 
order to justify judicial review.  Low-level executive officials 
take the Article VI oath as well.  Taking an oath to obey the 
Constitution is consistent, without more, with lacking 
authority to interpret for oneself.128
V. PRECEDENT AND THE NOT-MY-JOB DEFENSE 
 
Finally, we can apply an inter-temporal version of the 
distribution-of-interpretive-authority issue to think about 
 
 125. Recall as well Kant’s comments on the need for “artificial unanimity,” 
supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179–80 (1803) (“[I]t is 
apparent, that the framers of the Constitution contemplated that instrument, 
as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the Legislature.  Why 
otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath 
certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official 
character.  How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the 
instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to 
support?”). 
 127. See id. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular 
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict 
with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each.”). 
 128. This criticism of the oath argument, and a not-my-job limit to the 
responsibility to speak about the Constitution, is essentially the same argument 
presented in Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 353 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., 
dissenting) (“The oath to support the constitution is not peculiar to the judges, 
but is taken indiscriminately by every officer of the government, and is designed 
rather as a test of the political principles of the man, than to bind the officer in 
the discharge of his duty; otherwise it were difficult to determine what 
operation it is to have in the case of a recorder of deeds, for instance, who in the 
execution of his office has nothing to do with the constitution.  But granting it to 
relate to the official conduct of the judge, as well as every other officer, and not 
to his political principles, still it must be understood in reference to supporting 
the constitution, only as far as that may be involved in his official duty; and 
consequently if his official duty does not comprehend an inquiry into the 
authority of the legislature, neither does his oath.”) (emphasis added). 
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precedent.  Gary Lawson has suggested that Marbury’s 
argument for judicial review entails that precedent is 
unconstitutional; a court’s decision at time 1 has no more 
right to be preferred to a statute by a court at time 2 than 
would a statute.129
The not-my-job defense allows that some officials, even 
those whose jobs directly involve constitutional issues, come 
to the scene with those constitutional issues already settled, 
or with others having taken responsibility for decisions 
regarding the Constitution.  Courts frequently decline to 
revisit questions of constitutional law because it is “too late in 
the day”
  Adhering to an earlier court decision 
rather than the Constitution is, to Lawson, abdication of one’s 
responsibility in virtue of the constitutional oath.  However, 
the interbranch and intraexecutive not-my-job defenses can 
be used intertemporally as well to justify such adherence.  
Precedent can represent a temporal division of interpretive 
labor, rather than, as Lawson sees it, necessary 
unfaithfulness in performing one’s own job. 
130
 
 129. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 23, 27 (1994) (“Suppose now that a court is faced with a conflict 
between the Constitution on the one hand and a prior judicial decision on the 
other.  Is there any doubt that, under the reasoning of Marbury, the court must 
choose the Constitution over the prior decision?  If a statute, enacted with all 
the majestic formalities for lawmaking prescribed in the Constitution, and 
stamped with the imprimatur of representative democracy, cannot legitimately 
be given effect in an adjudication when it conflicts with the Constitution, how 
can a mere judicial decision possibly have a greater legal status?”). 
 to do so.  Two early instances of the same idea 
 130. For instances in which the Supreme Court or its individual justices have 
said that it is (or may be) “too late in the day” to reconsider various precedents.  
See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1959 (2008) (“[I]t is 
too late in the day in effect to overturn the holding in [Sullivan v. Little Hunting 
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969)], that case (nor does CBOCS ask us to do so) on 
the basis of a linguistic argument that was apparent, and which the Court did 
not embrace at that time.”); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 360–
61 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is far too late in the day to argue that the 
Due Process Clause merely guarantees fair procedure and imposes no 
substantive limits on a State’s lawmaking power.”); Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 
U.S. 125, 135 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“It is doubtful whether a party 
who has no personal constitutional right at stake in a case should ever be 
allowed to litigate the constitutional rights of others . . . .  It may be too late in 
the day to return to this traditional view.”); Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 
465, 483 (2004) (“Because our decision in [Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 
520 U.S. 953 (1997)] assumes that cramdown interest rates are adjusted to 
‘offset,’ to the extent possible, the risk of default . . . and because so many judges 
who have considered the issue (including the authors of the four earlier opinions 
in this case) have rejected the risk-free approach, we think it too late in the day 
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appeared in Stuart v. Laird in 1803131 and (hypothetically) in 
McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819.132
 
to endorse that approach now.”); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 314 
(1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The notion that the label attached to the 
proceeding is dispositive runs contrary to the trend of our recent cases. . . . 
Indeed, in reaching that conclusion [in a 1989 case], we followed a 1931 decision 
that noted that a tax statute might be considered punitive for double jeopardy 
purposes.  It is thus far too late in the day to contend that the label placed on a 
punitive proceeding determines whether it is covered by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.”); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 710 (1995) (“ ‘ [T]he 
adjudicative functions exception to section 1001 has been suggested or 
recognized by appellate decisions since 1962, not long after the Supreme Court 
decided that section 1001 applies to matters within the jurisdiction of the 
judicial branch.  In these twenty-three years, there has been no response on the 
part of Congress either repudiating the limitation or refining it.  It therefore 
seems too late in the day to hold that no exception exists.’ ”  (quoting United 
States v. Mayer, 775 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Although I might be 
willing to return to the original understanding [of the Commerce Clause], I 
recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a 
fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years.  Consideration of stare decisis 
and reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean.”); 
White v. Ill., 502 U.S. 346, 352–53 (1992) (“Such a narrow reading of the 
Confrontation Clause which would virtually eliminate its role in restricting the 
admission of hearsay testimony, is foreclosed by our prior cases. . . . We think 
that the argument presented by the Government comes too late in the day to 
warrant reexamination of this approach.”); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, 
Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 579 (1990) (“[I]t is too late in the day for 
this Court to profess that the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury 
trial only in cases that would have been heard in the British law courts of the 
18th century.”); Jefferson Cnty. Pharm. Ass’n v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S. 150, 154 
n.6 (1983) (“It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regulate 
States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in 
proprietary activities.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (“It is too 
late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be 
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege”). 
  Following the resolution 
 131. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (considering 
constitutional objection to circuit riding, with Marshall recused because he was 
the one who had ridden circuit in the case below: “To this objection, which is of 
recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice, and acquiescence under it, 
for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial 
system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.  It 
is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature.  This practical 
exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled.  Of course, the 
question is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed.”). 
 132. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (“[H]as 
Congress power to incorporate a bank?  It has been truly said, that this can 
scarcely be considered as an open question, entirely unprejudiced by the former 
proceedings of the nation respecting it.  The principle now contested was 
introduced at a very early period of our history, has been recognised [sic] by 
many successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the judicial 
department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation.”). 
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of two of their disagreements, Alexander Hamilton and James 
Madison each acquiesced in the contrary judgments of 
history: the Senate’s power to prevent an officer’s removal, 
where history favored Madison, and Hamilton thus regarded 
it as “settled in practice,”133 and the federal power to charter a 
bank, where history favored Hamilton, and Madison thus 
agreed to “waiv[e] the question” as president.134
Expressions of the idea that it is sometimes too late in 
the day to revise settled precedents are much more frequent 
than precise accounts of exactly how late is too late.  Richard 
Epstein has stated, “I do not have, nor do I know of anyone 
who has, a good theory that explains when it is appropriate to 





  A problem for which even Richard Epstein lacks a 
theory is a difficult problem indeed! 
 
 133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (George F. 
Hopkins ed., 1802) (“It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be 
expected from the co-operation of the senate, in the business of appointments, 
that it would contribute to the stability of the administration.  The consent of 
that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.  [Footnote:]  This 
construction has since been rejected by the legislature; and it is now settled in 
practice, that the power of displacing belongs exclusively to the president.”).  
For the issue of Hamilton’s approval of the footnote, see, e.g., Seth Barrett 
Tillman, The Puzzle of Hamilton’s Federalist No. 77, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 149, 166–67 n.38 (2010). 
 134. See Memorandum from James Madison to the Senate of the United 
States, Veto Message on the National Bank (Jan. 30, 1815), available at 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3626 (“Waiving the question of 
the constitutional authority of the Legislature to establish an incorporated bank 
as being precluded in my judgment by repeated recognitions under varied 
circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by 
indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation. 
. . . .”). 
 135. Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. 
REV. 1387, 1455 (1987).  There has been a lot of work done on precedent since 
1987, of course, but precise criteria are hard to come by.  For one excellent 
investigation providing some historical support for a reliance-based 
preservation of entrenched precedent, while still applying a presumption that 
demonstrably-erroneous precedent should be overruled, see Caleb Nelson, Stare 
Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 20 n.62 
(2003) (citing Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. (2 Tyng) 475, 477 (1807); Bevan v. 
Taylor, 7 Serg. & Rawle 397, 401–02 (Pa. 1821); Girard v. Taggart, 5 Serg. & 
Rawle 19, 539–40 (Pa. 1818) (opinion of Duncan, J.); Kerlin’s Lessee v. Bull, 1 
Dall. 175, 179 (Pa. 1786); Nelson v. Allen, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 360, 376–77 (1830); 
Taylor v. French, 19 Vt. 49, 53 (1846); Fisher v. Horicon Iron & Mfg. Co., 10 
Wis. 351, 353–55 (1860)). 
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One established model for deciding too-embedded-to-
correct questions is adverse possession.  Adverse possession is 
a well-worn, time-tested model for rendering systems of 
property rights workable and for preventing a strict 
requirement for practically-unobtainable consent from 
causing complete gridlock.  Sometimes it is much more 
important that something be settled than that it be settled 
right, and this applies both to constitutions and to property 
rights.  “If we had no doctrine of adverse possession, we 
should have to invent something very like it.”136
When to let old constitutional determinations lie is, like 
the principles of restraint defended above, an issue of 
constitutional construction.  It is not part of constitutional 
interpretation—the derivation of meaning from the 
constitutional text—but it is yet a critical component of a full 
account of constitutional adjudication.  Principles of 
constitutional prescription govern when to interpret the 
Constitution, and that issue is a distinct question from 
deciding what it means.  Allowing an earlier possibly-
incorrect decision about the Constitution to stand is an 
instance of deciding not to interpret the Constitution for 
oneself—or at least, of not allowing one’s interpretation of the 
Constitution to interfere with one’s job.  Accordingly, a theory 
of constitutional interpretation that only tells us how to 
interpret a constitution, once we have decided that 
interpretation is required by our job, will generally not 
  My 
suggestion here will, however, not offer any precise criterion 
to govern the retention of possibly-incorrect precedent.  I 
suggest only that the power to retain and follow old precedent 
without re-asserting the correctness of the precedent—that is, 
without saying that the precedent is authorized by the 
Constitution—simply assigns the power to interpret the 
Constitution to the Court at time 1, not the Court at time 2.  
Precedent is thus a buck-passing move precisely analogous to 
the buck-passing moves from the executive branch to the 
legislative branch, which a requirement of proof for executive 
review must allow, and buck-passing moves among executive 
officials, which any non-anarchic system of executive power 
would need. 
 
 136. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 860 
(3d ed. 2000). 
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resolve when to keep erroneous decisions.  Of course, a 
constitution may have particular provisions relevant to when 
it is proper, or not, to let possibly-incorrect decisions stand, 
and a theory of interpretation as applied to those provisions 
would help resolve such issues, but the theory of how to 
interpret would not resolve them on its own.  Because when-
to-interpret questions are critical to the manner in which a 
Constitution will be applied and implemented, yet are distinct 
from straightforward questions of constitutional 
interpretation, they are, like principles for handing 
uncertainty, issues of constitutional construction. 
Recognizing the distinction between when to interpret 
and how to interpret is the key to seeing why recognizing the 
power to adhere to a possibly-incorrect earlier decision does 
not entail recognizing a general power to revise the 
Constitution freely.  Deciding that it is more important that 
some issues are more importantly settled than settled 
correctly does not alter the criterion for what answers are 
actually correct.  The Constitution still means what it means, 
and interpreters subject to an adverse-possession rule need 
neither surrender their convictions about its meaning 
through the equivalent of an intellectual lobotomy, nor 
believe that interpreters are free to shift and morph the 
meaning of the Constitution without any constraint.  
Precisely because it is part of constitutional construction, and 
not constitutional interpretation, an adverse-possession 
model for adherence to incorrectly-decided precedent would 
merely limit the power of present interpreters to give effect to 
their interpretations; it would not affect their interpretations 
as such. 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional ontology—what renders constitutional 
claims true or false—is distinct from constitutional 
epistemology—what renders constitutional claims known or 
unknown.  The constitutional epistemology I present here 
requires those who apply the constitution to do four things.  
First, they should refrain from making pronouncements 
about the Constitution when ignorant of relevant facts.  
Second, they should recognize the contingency of particular 
jobs’ responsibility and authority to speak about the 
Constitution and stay within those parameters, which 
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sometimes means leaving constitutional interpretation to 
others, even when others err.  Third, they should apply a 
level of proof for constitutional questions appropriate to the 
discharge of their particular job, recognizing the contingency 
of that level of proof for those in different jobs.  Fourth, they 
should not ignore any considerations relevant to the 
Constitution’s requirements for issues properly within their 
jurisdiction. 
